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BOOKS

TopiK

REVIEWED

By Theodor Viehweg. Second revised edition. Munich:
C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1963. Pp. viii, 75. DM 10.
UND JURISPRUDENz.

This challenging little book was first published in 1953. Though it was
regarded as significant enough to be translated into Italian and Spanish, it went
almost wholly unnoticed in English-speaking countries. The present reprinting
(with minor changes) offers an occasion for some attempt to right this balance.
For the bcok should be of interest to lawyers everywhere. Its basic concern
is to clarify the kind of intellectual process that may be said to constitute "rational"
or "valid" legal argument. This question has been the subject of an increasing
body of literature in recent years.' It is doubtful whether any of this literature
exceeds in value the book under review, which not only presents an interesting
history of disputes about legal method but analyzes clearly and cogently why
the attempt to-apply the methods of deductive logic to legal reasoning
to fail.

is bound

The dream that the law may be shaped into an axiomatic system is an ancient
and ever recurring one. Failures to achieve this ideal are likely to be attributed
to human error and lack of foresight, rather than to the inappropriateness of
the model chosen for emulation. Much the best part of Professor Viehweg's
book lies in his analysis of the ways in which this model does and must fail. It
is an analysis that penetrates much beyond such commonplace problems as that
of the unforeseen case. He observes, for example, that a pervasive difficulty with
the axiomatic model lies in the fact that the intentions and actions of men never
coincide neatly with the lines laid out for their regulation by the law. What
we commonly describe as an "application" of the law therefore involves in
reality a reciprocal adjustment between the categories of law and those of life.
(pp. 60-61)
A reading of the book helps one to realize the extent to which lawyers are
constantly making inconspicuous bui crucial decisions of legal method. These
I See, for example, the various books and articles of Chaim Perelman and his associates,
especially PERELMAN and OLBRECHTs-TYTEcA, LA NOVELLE RHftTORIQUE-TRAIT DE
L'ARGUMENTATION

(1958);

JAMES WARD SMITH, THEME FOR REASON

(1957);

RATIONAL

DECasIoN, a collection of essays forming Vol. VII of NoMos (1964); and Hart and McNaughton, Evidence and Interference in the Law, DAEDALUS 40-64 (Fall, 1958). On what
may be called the epistemology of purposive actions and institutions as an object of human
understanding, see MICHAEL POLANYT, THE LOOIC OF IABERTY (1951) and PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE (1958); some interest may also be found in the exchange between Professor
Ernest Nagel and the reviewer in 3 NATURAL LAW FORUM 68-108 (1958) and 4 NATURAL
LAW FoRum 26-43 (1959).' Useful analysis of the modes of thought appropriate to
reasoning from precedents after the tradition of the Anglo-American common law will
be found in CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1932); LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION

(1960);
CATION

TO LEGAL REASONING (1948); LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADIMTON
WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DicisION: TOWARD A THEORY OF LEGAL JUSTIFI-

(1961).

LON L. FULLER
decisions are often made intuitively and perhaps even without any awareness
that an alternative was presented. They are, in any event, seldom defended or
explained in any explicit way though they abound in the literature of the law.
Scattered through the Restatements of the American Law Institute, for example,
one will encounter repeated instances of a tacit choice between competing modes
of dealing with the same kind of problem. Many sections of the Restatements
have a structure that may be thus formalized:
If in the case of hand Facts A, B and C are present, then Legal Consequence
X attaches.
An alternative form of statement, adopted somewhat less frequently, reads:
In determining whether Legal Consequence Y shall attach to a given set of
facts, the following factors are to be taken into account: D, E, F, G, H, I
and 1.
In the Restatement of Contracts, for example, the rule concerning liability
for "special damages" (the problem of Hadley v.' Baxendale, 1854, 9 Exch. 341)
takes the first form (§ 330), while the rule for determining whether a "material
breach" of contract has occurred (with the appropriate consequences incident
thereto) takes the second form (§ 275). A little reflection will reveal that each
of these sections could be recast in the form of the other and that such a recasting, without producing any immediately foreseeable difference in the legal treatment of particular cases, would nevertheless alter the whole atmosphere of decision. Plainly the first of these two forms is congenial to the axiomatic method;
the second openly deserts it. Perhaps existing practice might not be inaccurately
described by saying that the draftsman will stick to the first form when he can
and embrace the second when he must.
Like every other work in its general field, Viehweg's is stronger in its rejections
than in its recommendations. It suggests that a useful model for sound legal
reasoning is to be found in Aristotle's Topics, the title of the book itself being
derived from this recommendation. The pervasive sense of purpose, or of biological growth toward an implicit end, which runs through all of Aristotle's
thought, makes it congenial to those concerned with human sciences, who may
find 'here some escape from mechanical models of patent artificiality. But this
relief lies in the spirit of Aristotle's thought rather than in any clearly definable
method it exemplifies. One will encounter this spirit not only in the Topics, but
in the Ethics and the Rhetoric. Viehweg himself recognizes the vagueness of
the recommended model by referring to it at times as a "style" of thought.
One may suggest that any more precise standard for good legal reasoning
will require a separate consideration of the various branches of the law. Take,
for example, the contrast in method exemplified by the criminal law as compared with the law of contracts. The law of contracts builds on a social ordering
that develops outside the law. The law of crimes, in contrast, confronts what
may be called social entropy. It is inevitable that this profound difference in
subject matter should demand radically different methods of reasoning in the
two branches of the law. Without attempting to develop the full implications
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implicit in the taking of such distinctions, Viehweg's book nevertheless suggests
their significance, especially in the chapter entitled "Topik und Zivilistik" (pp.
64-75), which examines the methods appropriate to what we could call roughly
"private law."
If in the end we derive less help from Viehweg's little treatise than we had
hoped, some comfort may be obtained from a realization that the alternative
model (the axiomatic method) has itself come under a cloud in its own homeland, that of logic and mathematics. I quote from an article entitled "Gbdel's
Proof," by Ernest Nagel and James R. Newman:
Gtdel attacked a central problem in the foundations of mathematics.
The axiomatic method invented by the Greeks has always been regarded as
the strongest foundation for erecting systems of mathematical thinking. This
method, as every student of logic knows, consists in assuming certain propositions or axioms (e.g., if equals be added to equals, the wholes are equal)
and deriving other propositions or theorems from the axioms . . .Mathematicians came to hope and believe that the whole realm of mathematical
reasoning could be brought into order by way of the axiomatic method.
Gtdel's paper put an end to this hope. He confronted mathematicians
with proof that the axiomatic method has certain inherent limitations which
rule out any possibility that even the ordinary arithmetic of whole numbers
can ever be fully systematized by its means. What is more, his proofs brought
the astounding and melancholy revelation that it is impossible to establish
the logical consistency of any complex deductive system except by assuming
principles of reasoning whose
own internal consistency is as open to question
as that of the system itself. 2
In any field of thought the problem of the proper method to be followed
turns out in the end to be the most exasperating of all. We know that the choice
of method may be crucial to the success of the whole undertaking. J. W. N.
Sullivan has demonstrated how scientific investigation was held back for centuries by the obvious-seeming notion that to understand natural phenomena we
must first find out why things happen as they do. It was only when men gave
up this once exciting inquiry, and indeed became bored with it, that modern
science could take its beginnings in the more prosaic task of determining how
things happen. 3 On the other hand we know that a naive directness is often
less damaging than limitations of method self-consciously imposed. The modern
notion that man can best comprehend the actions of other men by applying to
them the methods of the sciences of inanimate matter may seem to some future
age as grotesque an error as that Sullivan ascribed to primitive science when
it insisted on asking what a rock was trying to do when it fell to earth. Faced
with the' awesome choice between doing what comes naturally and trying to
think our way toward the right way of thinking, we can, pending any final
resolution of our dilemma, find solace and a modest guidance from such perceptive studies as that of Professor Viehweg.
LON L. FULLER
2
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LAW IN A SCIENTIFIC AGE. By Edwin W. Patterson. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963. Pp. 87. $3.50.
In three lectures given at the Law School of Columbia University, Professor
Patterson explores three kinds of influence of science upon law: science has
brought about societal changes which in turn have presented new problems for
law to solve; scientific knowledge and devices have a bearing on the determination of factual issues in legal proceedings; and science represents a way of thought
and possibly a measure of success suggestive for or critical of legal reasoning,
systems, and institutions. Two of the essays elaborate the latter point; namely,
the "ideal" influences of science upon law. Scientific method suggests for law
the, importance of "neutral, impersonal, reliable, evaluative determinations"
- the "by-truth-possessed inquirer"; the importance of controlled experiments
or statistical generalizations; the utility of laws and theories which make possible the logical structural frameworks necessary for further criticism and
investigation.
Patterson classifies the uses of factual research of legal empiricism. Thus
there are inquiries into the goals of law, such as Bentham's, Pound's, McDougal
and Lasswell's, and Fuller's, where an appraisal of means, Patterson suggests,
is required to give substance to the goals. The goals may be long range or intermediate. The inquiry may be as to the multiple purposes of a law, such as the
Statute of Frauds; or as to the effect of means, which may be destructive of
desirable objectives, as was the case with the national prohibition law. The
inquiry may be as to the evaluative facts which will help create or explain those
legal rules which will make law more orderly and understandable. Controlled
experiments or statistical generalizations perhaps may be used to determine the
effectiveness of such matters as capital punishment. And empirical statistical
inquiries may be used to determine the results of legal procedure as was done
by the Gluecks on the treatment of offenders and the prediction of juvenile
delinquency, by the Chicago Jury Project to determine the effect of evidence
and- instructions, and by the Columbia Law School Project for Effective Justice
on certain aspects of personal injury litigation and on devices that would lessen
trial delays.
• As must be apparent, the scope of the material covered in these three
lectures is broad. The material is handled with an appealing skepticism and
receptivity. The difficulties of controlled experiments are recognized. The
meager fulfillment of the once cherished hope that the social sciences would
provide scientific conclusions directly pertinent to legal evaluations is readily
admitted. The difficulty of evaluating procedures or laws in controversial areas
where "a little evidence and a big emotion are often decisive either way" (p. 65)
is set forth- clearly. There is an awareness of the high cost of organized scientific research and due recognition for the unscientific wisdom of judges and

the unpretentious yet useful empirical investigations of law professors and students accomplished without the paraphernalia of elaborate designs. On balance
the volume represents gracious encouragement for relevant empirical studies
with an. emphasis on the need for objective factual determinations.

sense the thrust of the volume is to be found in the following sentences:

In this
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The strict ethical standards that surround the judge and the deep
sense of responsibility that judges in our society feel are the best guarantees of ethical neutralism is the making of judicial evaluations that we
have as yet found. I believe that judges in their official conduct are
more unbiased than are scientists in their political pronouncements, but
still not as neutral as natural scientists in their laboratories. The standards of the latter deserve to be emulated by legal-empirical scientists
who will seek to find the factual bases of legal determinations. (pp. 36-37)
Patterson has not overlooked the role of public dialectic as the forum in
which "the distinction between statements of fact and statements of value serves
to locate the points about which further factual inquiries may be made, and
may lead to a reconciliation of competing evaluations." (pp. 33-34) Apparently his conclusion is that at least in actual practice the dialectic has not been
an effective substitute for the "by-truth-possessed inquirer."
Most of Patterson's first lecture is devoted to a discussion of the material
influences upon law of science and the products of its technology. Passing reference is made to the problem of controlling the use of the atom bomb, although
the example is used as a way of indicating how much more complicated the
control of men is than the control of particles of matter. Motor vehicles, drugs,
the dwindling -supply of fresh water, and the artificial seeding of the clouds are
mentioned as items or conditions where legal problems have some relationship
to technological changes or possibilities. To illustrate the problems using scientific knowledge in the legal process reference is made (1) to a Virginia
statute requiring the destruction of red cedar trees determined to be hosts of
cedar rust dangerous to apple crops; (2) to the right of a child to maintain an
action for prenatal injury possibly caused by deep x-ray therapy to the mother;
(3) to state statutes authorizing the sterilizing of mental defectives. The cedar
rust statute is used to illustrate the utility of permitting administrative discretion
to reactivate a statute presently unnecessary rather than repealing the statute no
longer required unless cedar rust develops a strain immune to all known fungicides. The prenatal injury case illustrates the necessity for the legal order to be
revised in the face of new facts, the point that proof of scientific "conclusions in
court seems to be unduly cumbersome" (pp. 17-18), and the view that "the
direct proof of scientific publication by qualified experts would be preferable to
the 'chancy' procedure of judicial notice." (p. 18) The statutes authorizing
sterilization are used to show that the Supreme Court was ill informed in the
case of Buck v. Bell, and the larger error of the optimistic assumption that these
laws would in a few generations eliminate mental defectives. Nevertheless Patterson concludes that these laws should not be repealed, for "the world needs
desperately to upgrade the mental ability of its population, and every bit helps."
(p. 22) Further it is said that the effects upon inmates who have been sterilized
is beneficial, and even if the offspring were normal, it would be reared by "at
least one socially inadequate parent." (p. 22)
Patterson's lectures are replete with examples of the kind of subjects upon
which law scientists give judgments or have views. There is a brief discussion of
the "logical-metaphysical separation of fact and value." This discussion is a
kind of reference to disputes about the content of systems of jurisprudence or
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the appropriate mechanism or authority for changes in the law well known
to the readers of the FORUM. Goal-directed legal philosophies are also mentioned with the comment that
such terms as "the public good," "freedom" are primarily rhetorical;
they have emotive effects upon the participants of a legal order, to the
extent that its society is a true community. They may have more specific
meaning in the context of special theories of law, as in Aristotle's
division of justice into rectificatory and distributive. Yet the notion
that these vague terms, without such a context, will serve to harmonize
and unify antagonistic groups of people has been shown more than
once to be fatuous. (p. 51)
There are views on biological and sociological matters, as for example on the
efficacy of sterilization. These views may be relevant to constitutional or legislative discussions. The appropriateness of administrative discretion for the
enforcement or nonenforcement of a statute are of a somewhat different order
since they relate more directly to the operations of the legal system. Conclusions as to the most appropriate way to bring before a tribunal the views of
experts on ' radiation in the prenatal injury case are of this order also, although
dealing with a different aspect of procedure. The propriety of changing legal
concepts to permit a child to maintain an action for prenatal injuries deals in
part with the arrangement and content of legal concepts, but as applied in the
radiation type of case involves all kinds of considerations as to which law as
a subject seems to have little to say.
Implicit in the lectures, then, is a disturbing question as to what law as a
discipline is all about. The legal order, since it is made for men in society, of
course must take account of the conditions of living which change, but this
does not make law the discipline which from itself provides the knowledge for
value judgments on all the events of living. Nor does it make law the normative or descriptive discipline of all the goals and all the mechanisms for the
good society. Patterson, paraphrasing Mr. Justice Frankfurter, states that
sociologists "may well be on tap, but not on top." (p. 56) Yet the range of
goal-directed philosophies for law is from those which seek to describe the good
society in full measure to those which seek to explain the special value of
legal process. The psychological and political efficacy of vague terms is directly
relevant-to the special values of the legal process. But even here if facts and
theories are to be found to challenge the conclusions derived at through undoubted on the job training in this realm, more than jurisprudence seems
involved. This is only to suggest that along with empirical studies more work
may'be required if not as to what is properly law then at least as to the appropriate range of relevant disciplines for a variety of problems.
EDwmun H. Ivi
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THE MoRALrrv oF LAw. By Lon L. Fuller. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univer-

sity Press, 1964. Pp. viii, 202. $5.00.
The consciences of jurisprudential thinkers, especially those who are partisans
of legal positivism, have been rudely challenged by the excesses of the Hitler
regime. Well known in this context is the impressive conversion of G. Radbruch,
the principal representative of positivism in the Germany of the period before
1933. The problem of respect owed the juridical order presented itself in practical terms to the German judges of the postwar era. To what extent should a
law or precedent which runs counter to the "sense of justice of all right-thinking
men" retain its validity for the judge who follows in the wake of a corrupt legal
system? A parable of the sort which Lon Fuller likes,, and which he publishes as
an appendix to his study (pp. 187-95) under the title "The Problem of the
Grudge Informer," clearly presents the moral, juridical, and political difficulties
which faced those jurists who inherited the baneful legacy of Hitler's rule. Is there
an obligation to respect the law ("Law is law") even if that law is opposed to
the most elementary rules of conscience? No one has ever claimed this. Even
the most intransigent positivists do not hesitate to recognize, especially after the
Nazi experience, that moral duty should in certain cases take precedence over
the respect due to law. For a positivist, however, the law commands a certain
respect by the very fact that it is the law - that it possesses the formal characteristics which determine a juridical order. This is the thesis defended by H. L. A.
Hart in his article, "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,"I and in
his brilliant book, The Concept of Law.2 It is to this affirmation that Fuller takes
exception, in the article written in response to Hart's "Positivism and Fidelity to
Law, A Reply to Professor Hart," 3 and in the present volume, The Morality of
Law.
Fuller admits that a legal order is not necessarily an order conformable to the
demands of morality - in its content it may violate particular moral principles.
But it cannot be characterized as a legal order unless it is in some way oriented
toward those conditions which constitute the sine qua non of all legality. These
conditions of Fuller constitute the "internal morality of law," a morality which
those who collaborate in the enterprise of law must respect if the law itself is to
command respect.
Fuller regards the law not as a system of internally consistent rules, but as
"the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules." If a
legal system is to be an efficacious means of ensuring the ends that the law proposes for itself, it must satisfy insofar as possible eight conditions; if it fails, it
risks failure in the "legal enterprise" in one way or another. These conditions are:
1. That there be general rules formed to guide particular actions.
2. That these rules be made known to the public, or at least to all those to
whom they are addressed.
3. That they not be retroactive.
1 71 HARVARD LAw REVIEw 593 (1958).
2 Ox'ord, Clarendon Press, 1961.
3 71 HARvARD LAw Rvi w 630 (1958).

CH. PERELMAN
4. That they be adequately clear and comprehensible.
5. That they not be inconsistent with one another.
6. That they not demand the impossible.
7. That they be reasonably stable, protected from continual changes.
8. That those charged to apply the law conform to its prescriptions.
This set of conditions which Fuller views as the "procedural version of natural
law" (p. 96) corresponds to what American law: characterizes as "due process
of law." (p. 103)
These requirements were systematically disregarded by Hitlerian law. For
Fuller it could not have been otherwise because a profoundly immoral lawmaking power cannot, in his view, without provoking outright scandal, observe
the rules of internal morality of the law. On the other hand, no legal system can
perfectly fulfill these conditions; they are no more than an ideal which can never
be fully attained. Since the juridical enterprise is in reality either more or less
effective, the existence of a legal system is for Fuller a question of degree; it
exists to a greater or lesser degree insofar as the juridical enterprise has succeeded
to a greater or lesser extent. Fuller does not hesitate to relate his conception of
law to the idea which Michael Polanyi developed in his work Personal Knowledge to characterize the scientific enterprise. (p. 120)
It follows from Fuller's conception of law that there is no necessity for a single
legal system to rule'over a population living in a given territory; as he sees it, it
is a lesson of history that for the most part the same populations are often subjected to different legal systems with individual laws and even different tribunals.
Private institutions, such as universities, are free to elaborate their own rules;
and these rules cannot be assimilated to contractual dispositions except by means
of fictions.
At first sight the conception presented would seem to make it difficult to
distinguish between law and morality. For Fuller, however, the fact that what is
involved is a deliberate undertaking makes understandable the way in which
it naturally leads to the establishment of legislative and judicial powers and also
to recourse to a system of sanctions in order to guarantee respect for their decisions. Such a conception of law, which sees in legal texts a means toward the
realization of certain ends, leads naturally to a teleological interpretation of
these texts, as opposed to an analytical interpretation, and especially one which
focuses on the sense of each term of the law to get its meaning.
For Fuller, all morality may be divided into a morality of duty and a morality
of aspiration - the first imposing a minimum of obligations indispensable for
life in society, the second seeking to realize an ideal of the good life. Since the
law has only to impose the minimum of rules necessary for the life of society, it
can be linked with the morality of duty, which is made known chiefly in prohibitions easy to formulate. As only a minimum of rules can be made binding upon
all, it is essential in Fuller's view that individuals be permitted to have different
moralities of aspiration, different ways of realizing their ideals of life. The distinction of this type, which sets the demands of life in society against the ideal
of individual liberty without thereby raising conflicts, seems somewhat optimistic
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to me, insofar as it seems to exclude conflicts between the morality of aspiration
and the morality of duty or law. Can we not conceive of a morality of aspiration forcing us to oppose juridical laws? We have only to think of the problem
posed by the conscientious objector to see at once that the scheme given us by
Fuller somewhat oversimplifies reality by doing away with the possibility of conflict between moral and legal obligations.
What we should particularly note is that Fuller's analysis fails to give any
great weight either to the statist aspect of law (a concept so pronounced in the
work of Kelsen, for example) or to sanction, which is often considered characteristic of the rule of law.
The rules which express the internal morality of law enable a legal order to
assure "legal certainty." What best satisfies the demand for such certainty is a
long-standing custom, well known and respected on all sides, in a static society,
so that there is never any need to have recourse to judges to interpret it and to
ensure respect for it. Legal enterprise is chiefly indispensable to a society which
is evolving and so in need of the capacity to adapt to new situations by the
help of legislative intervention, judicial interpretation, and the sanctions necessary to assure respect for new rules. It is because it should be capable of innovation that law can be considered as an enterprise. But if it is to guarantee respect
for its rules, if they are to guide effectively the conduct of men, is the internal
morality of law as envisaged by Fuller adequate? Is it enough to assure legal
certainty, and is it not equally important that those whose conduct we wish to
regulate should respect, spontaneously, the legal norms, either because they
recognize their utility and their justice, or because they admit the competence and
the authority of those who have adopted and promulgated them? If law is indeed
an enterprise to be judged by its success, that success will be all the greater if
obedience to its norms is owing more to persuasion than to force, if it is recognized that its rules contribute to the realization of justice and the common good,
if there is respect for the legislators charged with elaborating the rules and the
judges charged with applying them. Sanction, resort to force, should, in this perspective, intervene only as the ultima ratio regum, the last and not the first motive
for justifying obedience to the law. From this point of view we can understand the
anarchistic dream of an ideal society in which force is forsworn, where no one
looks to the State to apply force or to a law which envisages its use. Is not, in
fact, the law which we conform to voluntarily, in the absence of any organized
sanction, apt to be, like international public law, for example, the one most
scrupulously concerned to convince those whom it seeks to regulate of the justice
of its dispositions?
The merit and novelty of Fuller's attempt lie in its bringing out of the fact
that what is regarded by positivists as the specific characteristic of law - the
existence, that is, of legislators, judges, and gendarmes - constitutes no more
than a group of techniques created to eliminate the inflexibility of old laws, their
obscurity and the contempt into which they have fallen. Actually, insofar as the
juridical enterprise is successful, its rules clear and unquestioned, those to whom
these rules are addressed observe them of their own accord; they are like the
rules of custom which, whatever their origin and inspiration, regulate without
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incident the life of primitive societies. Do not the general principles of law,
which we are considered to know independently of the legislator's intervention,
present the same characteristics? By dint of taking as the specific features of the
law those features which distinguish a system of law from religious, moral, or
customary prescriptions, we have neglected what all these have in common - the
aim of regulating the behavior of men.
Although Fuller's study has not drawn all the consequences which seem to me
to flow from his point of view, it has nevertheless the great merit of having
focused attention upon certain of these consequences, those which relate to the
achievement of legal certainty through what he calls the internal morality of law.
With, lucidity and force, in his habitual charming way, he brings us successfully further away from the trodden paths of legal positivism. Analyzing the idea of legal order he stresses his "procedural version of natural law."
But respect for law demands more. We must be convinced that the laws are just
and tend to the common good, or at least, we must recognize the authority and
legitimacy of those who are legally qualified to decide what is just and realizes
the common good.
CH. PERELMAN

Translated

LA LEo0E

by JEANNE RODES.

DELLA RAGIONE.

By Guido Fass6. Bologna: II Mulino, 1964. Pp. viii,

313. L. 3,000.
The audaciousness of the book's title is indicative of the scope of Fass6's
subject matter. In eight chapters, he deals with many of the highlights in the
history of natural law theory - or at least in the rationalist strain in that history
as he conceives it-from classical to recent times. Professor Fass6's outstanding
ability as a historian of legal philosophy is, of course, beyond question. He
commands his texts with great mastery, and he seals his points by reproducing
entire passages from relevant authors in a fifty-page appendix. In the very
first sentence of his preface, however, Fass6 informs us that his purpose is primarily not historical, but rather systematic: he proposes to inquire into the possible contemporary validity of the notion of natural law. We must take him at
his word, and I shall direct most of my comments to systematic elements in the
book. It will nevertheless be helpful to begin by recapitulating briefly some of
the main points in Fass6's historical treatment. Thereafter, I shall want to raise
some questions and to offer some criticisms concerning Fass6's handling of the
following four general issues: (1) stereotypes, (2) metaphysics, (3) the meaning of reason, and (4) the meaning of morality and religion.
The highest form of "law" for the early Christians, according to Fass6, was
not truly law at all, in the sense of a rational proposition or propositions directed
to the will. (p. 24) The spirit of early Christianity was one of a mysticism not
assimilable to philosophy, and this is seen very clearly in the strong antipathy
that is to be found in the mature thought of St. Augustine towards the humanistic,
rationalistic, classical conception of natural law. In the early Middle Ages, a
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revival of interest in natural law and a tendency to return to the rationalist
spirit of Pelagius are discernible in the writings of such figures as Rufinus, Anselm
of Laon, and William of Auxerre. But the focal point of Fass6's study of rationalism in the history of natural law is, as one might well have expected, St.
Thomas Aquinas. Fass6 declares himself willing to go further than almost any
other contemporary commentator in depicting "un san Tommaso 'laico' " (p.
72), the defender of a humanism which is not, as Maritain would have it, "theocentric," and the developer of a system of ethics which is, in an important sense,
autonomous in relation to theology. Fass6 meets the objection that Thomism
was made to serve the interests of church against state by pointing out that
curialism found itself just as much at home in the theories of St. Thomas's
voluntarist opponents, and that the possibilities of diverse political interpretations of a moral doctrine do not necessarily detract from its validity. Even if
the attitudes adopted by William of Ockham towards church-state relations in
his day were more akin to dominant modern attitudes on the same subject than
were those of St. Thomas, this is not sufficient to alter Fass6's appraisal of the
Franciscan as the archvoluntarist and consequently the archfoe. Ockham's God
is able to suppress any part of the moral law at whim, and this doctrine, in
Fass6's eyes, is enough to overshadow a multitude of virtues. In summarizing
his chapter on "Ragione e volont" in the Middle Ages, Fass5 praises the high
moral tone of the Augustinian, Franciscan, mystical, voluntarist tradition, but
concludes that its struggle against the institutionalization and pharisaism of
Christianity is at the same time "lotta contro il diritto, contro lo Stato (anche
se occasionalmente si serve di esso), contro la razionalita della vita sociale, contro 1' umanita di questa." (p. 123) Fass6 thus makes his preferences clear enough.
The famous assertion of Grotius that there would be a natural law even if
there were no God is shown to be less original, in the light of the previous history,
than it is sometimes thought. Among. youthful influences against whom Grotius
later reacted was Fernando Vizquez de Menchaca, an extreme Ockhamist; but
the autonomous morality defended by another Vizquez, Gabriele, a CounterReformation Jesuit commentator on St. Thomas, was at least as daring as that
of Grotius. Fass6 has relatively little to say about Hobbes, whom he of course
views primarily as an opponent, but he devotes considerable space to defending
and lavishing praise on Locke. He recounts the development in Locke's thought,
from a youthful voluntarism to the mature position of the Treatises, as it may be
traced in W. von Leyden's edition of the Latin essays.' To the deeper philosophical problem of reconciling the epistemology of the Essay Concerning Human
Understanding with that which seems to underlie the natural law theory of the
Second Treatise, however, Fass6 makes no contribution. He does not attempt
to continue a chronological historical development beyond the time of Locke, but
instead concentrates, in his final two chapters, on elaborating his reasons for
upholding the value of the natural law concept today. The only valid natural
law theory, according to our author, is one which is critical, antiabsolutist,
tolerant, and historically oriented. At one time, he admits, he suggested that
SJOHN LOCKE, ESSAYS

ON THE LAW OF NATURE

(Oxford, 1954).

WILLIAM LEON McBRIDE
it was inappropriate to apply the expression "natural law" to any nonpositivist
conception of law which failed to incorporate the quality of immutability; now,
however, he has changed his mind concerning the appropriateness of this. Natural law theory is of immense worth, he feels, in combating various modern
forms of irrationalism and, because it is critical by nature, in promoting a spirit
of freedom in the everyday lives of individuals. (p. 215) He attempts to refute
the old and superficially striking argument that natural law is seldom discussed
in the country in which the very forms of rationality and constitutionalism which
he himself most favors have their firmest roots, England, by stressing the importance of "the rule of law" in the English common law tradition. Finally, he
raises and tries to answer the two objections to natural law which he considers
most serious- that it is uncertain and that it fosters an ethical legalism which
is in contradiction' with the nature of true morality. I shall return later to a
consideration of these last points.
1) Stereotypes. One of Fass6's principal wishes is to get away from stereotypes, or facile labels. A blatant example of labelling is what he calls "lo schema
idealistico-gpiritualistico-modemistico," which divides the history of Western
thought into four clear-cut periods- ancient, early Christian, medieval, and
modern- and contrasts the alleged objectivism of the first and third with the
alleged subjectivism of the second and fourth. (p. 5) Fass6 goes on to try to
show that Cicero's conception of natural law, for example, is based on a recognition of the peculiar subjectivity of man as distinguished from the rest of nature,
and that a modem Protestant thinker such as Locke is misunderstood if too
great an emphasis is placed on the subjectivism of the social contract idea at
the expense of the rationalistic, natural law side of his theory. In the end, though,
Fass6 does not appear to have escaped as completely as he would like to believe
from the categories of the idealist interpretation of history which he admits to
having accepted at one time. (p. 6) In an excellent passage leading to his discussion of Hobbes and Locke, he attacks the oversimplification and distortion
involved in viewing later natural law theory as upholding the priority of subjective, innate natural rights over all objective natural (as distinguished from
positive) law, and he correctly points out that "diritto soggettivo e diritto oggettivo" are, logically speaking, correlative terms. (p. 169) In another passage,
however, Fass6 vigorously denies that earlier Christianity can be regarded as in
any way subjectivistic except with reference to the transcendent, absolute Subject,
the Father. (p. 27) Fass6 thus seems to find the labels of subjectivism and
objectivism, despite their acknowledged correlativeness and susceptibility to oversimplification, to be very useful polemical tools under certain circumstances. If
he really wants to get beyond the limitations" imposed by the vocabulary of idealism, he cannot afford to make use of such categories as consistently and frequently as he does throughout most of La legge della ragione.
The author's major pair of contrasting terms is that suggested by the title
and derived from a much earlier tradition than that of idealism, namely reason
and will. Passages may be pointed to (p. 192, for example) -inwhich Fass6
concedes that rationalistic natural law theories are rarely found in unalloyed form,
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devoid of all voluntarist or naturalist strains, and he makes a special point of
admitting that voluntarism has contributed something, namely the sense of State
sovereignty and autonomy, to modern legal and political thought. (p. 167) But
Fass6 seems satisfied only if and when he can place his writers .squarely in one
or the other camp, though he never, of course, resorts to tendentious interpretations of texts in order to achieve this result. Thus, he seems almost to regret the
fact that the basically voluntaristic Duns Scotus can be interpreted rationalistically
because of his view that the divine will cannot abrogate the first two commandments of the Decalogue; Fass6 feels much more at home with the blatant voluntarism of Ockham than with the subtlety, or (to use Fass6's turn of phrase) the
scrupulousness, of Scotus. In his constant effort to segregate the voluntarists
from the rationalists in a clear-cut fashion, Fassb never conceals his strong sympathies for the latter. I, for one, share these sympathies with him, and yet I
wonder whether his constant reliance on these two hoary contrast terms may
not be so great as to vitiate his previously mentioned purpose of avoiding stereotypes in interpreting the history of legal thought. After all, as Fass6 would be
among the first to admit, reason and will are also correlative. One has only to
recall Aristotle's analysis of deliberation and choice or St. Thomas's account
of the will to be aware of the possibility and even of the necessity of going beyond
the simple opposition of reason versus will in any fully elaborated philosophic
theory. 2 Fass6's examination of natural law theories does, it is true, enable him
to draw up a list of heroes and villains that differs markedly from the lists of
popular voluntarists of today, and to eliminate certain stereotypes, while perhaps
reinforcing others. A contemporary theologian of the Niebuhr school of thought,
for example, is apt to be less confident in asserting the essential modernism of
St. Augustine after having studied Fass6's analysis of this subject. 3 But, to take
an opposite example, it is just too simple to resolve the objection that Locke
is as much a voluntarist as Hobbes because the political theories of both are
based on a contract, by saying that the will, for Locke, exists to serve the reason,
whereas in Hobbes's commonwealth rationality is irrelevant. (p. 175) The gulf
between the two theories is obvious enough, and the contrast between rationalism
and voluntarism is of major assistance in accounting for it, but it is still necessary for the defender of Locke to answer the socialist criticism that Locke's doctrine of private property in a settled civil society amounts to nothing but a
rationalization of an arbitrary, irrational existing state of affairs, and for the
critic of Hobbes to explain how the latter could have developed his political
voluntarism by using a deductive, "geometrical" method which many have regarded as being ultrarationalist.
In questioning the stereotypes or labels which are the essential tools both
for Fass6's account of the history of natural law theory and for his view of the
contemporary scene in legal philosophy, I certainly have no intention of suggesting that the categories of subjectivism-objectivism and especially of reason2 Especially relevant is SUMMA THEOLOOIAE I, q. 82, art. 4, "Whether the Will Moves
the Intellect."
3 As an illustration of confident assertions on Augustine's modernity of. REINHOLD NiEBUHR, CHRISTIAN REALISM AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS 145-146 (New York, 1953).
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will are useless; far from it. Fass6's basic insight, namely, that what it is most
important to retain today from among the various strands of the natural law
tradition is the insistence upon reasonableness or rationality in the government
of social institutions, is an excellent one, and it certainly merits the sort of detailed development that Fass6 has been able to give it in this volume. But its
potential weaknesses and one-sidedness ought not to be overlooked. Part of the
reason why Fass6's rationalist-voluntarist divisions sometimes give the impression
of being stereotypes is that the author appears to share with a great many continental legal philosophers a contempt for what is called "metaphysics," a contempt which makes it difficult for him, as in the example of the Hobbes-Locke
contrast cited above, to take very seriously the ontological, psychological, and
epistemological presuppositions which frequently underlie moral and legal philosophies and render a choice between any two of them considerably more complex
than that suggested by the simple opposition between rationalism and voluntarism. This is my next critical point.
2) Metaphysics. In addition to the rationalist and voluntarist tendencies in
the history of natural law theories, Fass6 recognizes a third sort, naturalism. The
chapter in which he deals briefly with the early Middle Ages is entitled "Dio,
natura, ragione"; these headings are intended to refer to the three directions
open to development by Christian natural law theory on the basis of Isidore
of Seville's identification of God's law with nature. Natural law may be equated
with God's will, God may be equated with nature, or natural law may be equated
with reason. Of the three, only the development of the last-mentioned alternative is to serve as an important theme of Fass6's investigation, as he himself states
explicitly. (p. 50) But he is just as unable to ignore the possibility that some
theories of natural law may contain elements of both the naturalist and the
rationalist strands, as he is to deny the correlativeness of reason and will that I
mentioned earlier. Now, suppose we were to be confronted with a choice between
two alternative natural law theories, one of which seemed to meet all the requirements of Fass6's kind of "rationalism" in its pure form, and the other of which
consisted of a mixture, perhaps a fairly complex mixture, of rationalist and
naturalist elements; on what grounds might we decide that one was preferable
to the other? This seems to be a legitimate enough question, even though it is
not the sort of question that is very often raised in this book; after all, the
primary purpose of the entire book is to argue for the retention of that general
variety of natural law theory, the rationalist variety, which Fass6 deems best.
The answer that Fass6 would undoubtedly first give to such a question would
be an argument from practical consequences. He reasons from a felt need to
control the will. His principal argument against naturalistic natural law theories
is that such theories lead to the facile assertion of the natural necessity for the
strongest individuals, peoples, races, or classes to govern. (p. 190) One has of
course heard such arguments from evil consequences many times before, and
recent European experience lends great strength as well as poignancy to Fass6's
plea that all forms of irrationalism in legal and political theory be shunned. But
such an argument by itself can never be entirely convincing, especially when we
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recall Fass6's ready admission (in his defense of St. Thomas against the charge
that Thomism nurtured curialism) that a moral doctrine may lend itself to
diverse practical political interpretations. (pp. 82-83)
Quite another sort of reason for preferring a rationalistic natural law theory
to a naturalistic one is that given by Fassb when, in the same passage as that
previously cited from p. 190, he says that naturalism leads to the absorption of
the human subject into a deterministic and objectivistic natural organism. Naturalism views man deterministically, Fass6 seems to be saying here, and this is
wrong because it is a distortion of the true nature of man. If this is indeed his
view, there is nothing intensely original about it, but it is certainly a respectable
and widely held one. At the same time, however, it sounds suspiciously like a
simple, inchoate metaphysical theory, and Fass6 vigorously disapproves of such
things. For example, in explaining his apprehensions about natural law theories
that arise from certain forms of historicism or from liberal Catholic thought, he
says that it is the metaphysical premises of such theories which disturb him,
"perche la libertA a cui aspiriamo la libert concreta, empirica, degli individui,
degli uomini empirici, non la libert metafisca dell' Uomo assoluto o largita all'
uomo dall' Assoluto." (p. 217) Fass6 has a horror of every absolute, and this
seems to be the basis of his distrust of "metaphysics." But the term "metaphyics" is open to many diverse interpretations, and in a broad sense it is certainly applicable to a philosophy that holds that rationalism is preferable to
naturalism, because naturalism sees man as determined whereas man is in fact
free. The only satisfactory way in which Fass6 could ultimately answer my
question as to whether a purely rationalist natural law theory is to be preferred
to a hypothetical theory which combined elements of rationalism with elements
of naturalism would be to examine some of the underlying truth-claims concerning human psychology and knowledge upon which the two rival legal philosophies
were based, even if such activity might cast him in the role of a "metaphysician."
This is not to say either that Fass6 must ultimately be forced into an absolutist political theory akin to that of Plato's Republic, of which he manifests
such a horror, or that any acceptable natural law theory must be of an "ontological" variety which sees the natural laws as eternal parts of the structure of the
universe. But it is to say that Fasst's plea for the rationalistic form of natural
law will fail to carry complete conviction until he acknowledges that his own
preferences in legal philosophy, like those of most of the historical figures with
whom he deals, are founded on certain beliefs -call
them metaphysical, ontological, ideological, or whatever more neutral term can be found - about the
nature of man. One of the least convincing aspects of Fass6's generally impressive treatment of St. Thomas is his assertion that Aquinas is modern in his
ethics even though most of the other parts of his philosophy may remain ancillae
theologiae. (pp. 72-73) Surely Thomistic ethics is, more than most, incapable
of being separated from the rest of the philosopher's system without considerable
distortion. But Fass6's fear of "dogmatism" is so great that he seems to regard
large areas of systematic philosophy as "metaphysical" and therefore highly
dangerous. Hence his at times patently untenable disregard of underlying philosophical premises.
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3) The Meaning of Reason. A philosopher who steadfastly refuses to apply
any "dogmatic" interpretation to the concepts of "reason" and "rationalism,"
and who at the same time strongly favors natural law theories in which reason
rather than will or nature is proclaimed as the model for the conduct of social
life, finds himself in a rather peculiar situation. This is the next problem in
Fass6's work with which I wish to deal. The variety of meanings attached to
such concepts as "reason," "rationalism," and "reasonableness" in the history
of philosophy should give considerable pause to anyone who proposes to write
a book about "the law of reason." Fass6 is obviously aware of the potential pitfalls to which such a study may be subject, but it is difficult to escape the conclusion that, even at the end of the volume, he has failed to indicate with precision exactly what he understands by this family of concepts.
What is more, it is doubtful whether such precision is any part of his aim.
To the objection that he himself raises near the end of his volume, to the effect
that a nonlegislative natural law as he conceives it is radically uncertain, he
replies by asking whether legislative law can, in a time of rapid social change
such as our own, be any more certain. Indeed, he finds certainty, in the sense
of rigid stipulation of detail, to be at best a doubtful asset; one of the bases of
Fass6's great admiration for the common law tradition is the large scope that it
4
gives to procedures of adjudication which are not minutely prescribed by codes.
His attitude towards highly detailed natural law philosophies is apparently the
same as his attitude towards highly detailed codes: he regards Locke's refusal
to enter "into the particulars of the Law of Nature" as being one of the most
praiseworthy aspects of a generally praiseworthy theory. (p. 225) Fass6 thus
favors a deliberately vague conception of the natural law of reason, one which
would permit the most extensive possible practice of the archvirtue of tolerance
towards others. It is the alleged intolerance of "ideologies" and of metaphysical
absolutisms which most arouses his ire against them.
-The author's advocacy of reasonableness and tolerance is admirable and
clearly rooted in deep conviction. But it is important to raise, even if impossible
to answer here, an old and fundamental question which is suggested by a
reading of La legge della ragione: is it necessary that a philosophical theory
which argues for the virtues of vagueness in moral and political practice (i.e.,
free play, adjudication, tolerance beyond narrowly defined limits) be itself a
vague theory? Of the two historical figures upon whom Fass6 lavishes the greatest
praise in this volume, St. Thomas and Locke, I think that it will generally be
conceded that the legal philosophy of the former gives at least the superficial
appearance of being considerably more precise than that of the latter. Are the
precision and the tolerance of the two inversely proportional?5 If so, is the
philosophy of Locke to be preferred to that of St. Thomas by exactly the same
ratio, other factors being equal? These would have been interesting questions
4 Fass6 should not overlook the fact that the looseness of the common law system has
not always evoked universal enthusiasm for its "reasonableness." It is regrettable that he
does not refer to Bentham, for example, in this connection.
5 For some highly critical comments concerning St. Thomas on the question of tolerance,
cf. A. P. d'Entr~ves' introduction to his edition of AQuINAS - SELECTeD POLITICAL WRITINGS xxii (Oxford, 1959).
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for Fassb to comment upon. At any rate, the imprecision of Fass6's central
concept of "reason" in his own legal philosophy remains undeniable.
The culminating paradox of Fass6's approach to the problem of how to
define his "law of reason" occurs in his discussion of claimed immutability versus
historical mutability. He says that the chief basis for the modem polemic against
natural law is not that natural law clashes with positive law, but rather that
natural laws are said by their proponents to be eternal. Any theory which fails
to take into account the radical relativism produced by historical change, he
further holds, cannot hope to have a place in modem thought. But Fass6 has
become convinced of the value of natural law for modem thought and therefore maintains that it is appropriate to apply the expression "natural law" even
to a historically oriented nonpositivist conception of law. He acknowledges in
passing, however, that the characteristic of immutability was one of the few,
"per non dire il solo," that all the natural law doctrines of the past agreed in
affirming. (p. 202) We may therefore suspect that the last common bond linking the entire tradition of natural law thinking has been severed. This would
seem to make it all the more incumbent on the author to provide us with some

fairly definite indications of exactly what it is about his "law of reason" which
both relates it to, and distinguishes it from, the other possible approaches to
natural law which he has enumerated. If Fass6's law of reason is a historically
relative law, his readers would like to know just how relative it is. If it is in
principle entirely relative, i.e., if there is no single element in it which is not
subject to change, then is it not a strange locution to call it a "law"? Fass6
frequently refers to his form of natural law as critical.6 If his theory consists simply
in the principle that positive law can and should be criticized from a point of
view external to any existing positive law system but itself variable according to
time and place, then Fasst's principle is important, it is worth stating and defending, but it is lacking in the definiteness that his title suggests; and it seems
less than what his constant effort to contrast his with other kinds of natural law

theories might have led cne to expect.
Fass5 tends to minimize the dangers inherent in the vagueness of his appeal
to a relatively undefined (though clearly tolerant and nonabsolutist), intersubjective "reason." At the same time, he cautions strongly against the appeal to
an intersubjective "justice," which ib likely to remain, he says, on the level of
vague sentiment, and which thus leaves itself open to the attractions of various
forms of irrationalism. (p. 244) Some may not agree that the difference between the two appeals is as great as Fass6 would have it.7 The explanation of
his position here lies in his conceptions of morality and of religion, and it is to
this final critical issue that I now turn.
6 '"l solo giusnaturalismo che noi oggi possiamo accettare a un giusnaturalismo critico,
non dogmatico." (p. 232)
7-An interesting recent attempt to defend the applicability of the concept of "justice"
to concrete situations in law is the work of a German legal philosopher, MARTIN KRIELE,
KRITERUEN DER GERECHTIGIKEIT (Berlin, 1963). He shows, I think convincingly, that
"justice," even in everyday parlance, is not such a vague term as Fassb claims. In fact,
Kriele's "justice" serves many of the same functions as Fasst's "reason," except that Kriele
is more concerned than Fass6 with detailed analyses of meaning and less concerned with
historical precedents.
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4) The meaning of morality and religion. In the last few pages of La legge
della ragione, Fass6 raises what he considers to be the most serious objection to
his position, namely, the objection of those who, "seeing in natural law theory
a characteristic form of ethical legalism, think that it contradicts the very essence
of morality." (p. 243) He admits to having maintained at one time that sanctity was the only truly moral way of life, and he further admits to seeing some
merit in this view even now. But he has also come to the conclusion that a
would-be saint in this world could be a very dangerous person indeed. Perfect
justice, apparently, would be one characteristic of perfect sanctity, and this helps
to explain why Fass6 objects so strongly to appeals based on an intersubjective
"justice." His reasoning becomes even clearer in the light of one of his earlier
works, La storia come esperienza giuridica.8 There he argued that the idea of
justice is contradictory, because it suggests at once an absolute and perfect state
of harmony, which is a purely transcendent ideal, and the achievement of such
a state in the necessarily pluralistic world of actual social institutions. Reason,
he held in La storia, pertains to the governance of this -world, and thus is incompatible with true morality: "Razionalit e socialitA (o molteplicitA che 4
lo stesso), essendo 1' una in funzione dell' altra, del pari non pu6 ammettersi
una morale che sia razionale." 9 That is why, in the introduction to La legge
della ragione, he says that philosophy can in no way appropriate to itself the
purely transcendent, mystical vision of the early Christian religion. (p. 11) That
is also why he has no hesitation in repeating, in the final pages of the same book,
his contention that Ockham, whom he has criticized so severely, is more religious,
and in that sense more "moral," than St. Thomas. (p. 245)
But Fass6 offers no convincing reason why philosophy should refuse to deal
with what is alleged to be transcendent. It is of course true that the philosopher,
in the very act of conceptualizing what is alleged to be transcendent, detracts
from its transcendence and renders it to some extent immanent. This, perhaps,
is not such a bad thing. A religious philosopher, such as St. Thomas, does not
necessarily make himself less religious by doing so; he violates only a certain
narrow preconception of what religion must be. Similarly, a legal philosopher
who advocates the constant and critical application of reason to the governance
of social institutions is not necessarily taking the less moral path in departing
from the contemplation of pure, absolute, unattainable moral ideals; perhaps
a consideration of these ideals may be of assistance in understanding how social
institutions can be made rational, and it may be in this very process of relating
the ideal to the actual that "true" morality is to be found. The rather delightful,
amusingly "Italian" view that St. Thomas is much to be preferred to Ockham
precisely because the latter is more religious and, in a sense, more moral than
the former is a paradox which Fass6 might have done well to avoid. It betrays
his lingering suspicion that- the rational natural law (or, if one prefers the
pejorative phrase, the "ethical legalism") which, he has defended so vigorously
is only. a second-best form of morality;. but this can hardly be the case if - con-

8 Seninario Giuridico della Universiti di Bologna XVI (1953).
9 Op. cit. at 111.
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trary to those voluntarist and irrationalist opinions for which he retains what
is probably, after all, an excessive respect - it is the only possible form.
Most of my comments in this review have been directed to what I regard
as areas of potential controversy in the more systematic thought of La legge della
ragione. I repeat that I have concentrated on these questions, much to the
neglect of the many interesting historical points made throughout the book,
because of Fass6's own expressed concern to emphasize the contemporary relevance of natural law. It is because I share that concern, and especially because
the kind of natural law theory which Fass6 favors seems so attractive in its basic
characteristics (reasonableness, tolerance, capacity for adjustment to historical
change), that I have been anxious to suggest a few possible difficulties with a
view to its further elucidation and strengthening.
WILLIAM LEON MCBRIDE

THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SocIETY. Edited and with
Commentary by Arthur Taylor von Mehren. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1963. Pp. xxxviii, 706. $15.00.

LAW IN JAPAN.

This volume is a collection of seventeen papers by Japanese legal scholars
presented at the Conference on Japanese Law (Harvard Law School, Sept.
5-9, 1961) which concluded the Japanese-American Program for Cooperation
in Legal Studies (1954-61). They are divided into three parts: The Legal
System and the Law's Processes; The Individual, the State, and the Law; The
Law and the Economy. Each part is followed by a commentary by the editor,
which sums up the highlights of discussions at the conference. These commentaries and the recor,.i of other comments made at the conference by some
of forty participants, which are dispersed in the form of footnotes, serve to show
the context of these papers and sometimes to counterbalance some of the
observations in the papers. The papers, taken together, are designed "to
explore significant aspects of the contemporary Japanese legal order." (p. vi)
As the editor points out, the essays contained in this volume, instead of seeking to be self-sufficient individually, are arranged in such a way that, through
mutual complement, they might present accurately the concrete historicosocial reality that is the legal order in Japan. The writers consider their respective branch of law, not as an abstract system, but as it actually functions in
society. The method generally adopted, therefore, may be characterized as
that of sociological jurisprudence. The editor is to be commended for the
success of giving to this work a coherence and organic unity by his coordinating skill as well as his comprehension of the subject matter. Those who know
that the barrier of language is by no means a minor problem for Japanese
scholars can appreciate the value of editorial assistance given by American
collaborators. The result is the first major introductory work on Japanese
law by Japanese scholars in readable English.

B. RYOSUKE INAGAKI
At the opening of the book, the genesis and several phases of the program
are described by its architect, Professor Cavers of Harvard Law School. He
emphasizes the sense of responsibility on the part of American jurists which led
to the creation of the program. Toward the end of the period of military occupation in Japan, American legal scholars were informed of the predicament of
the Japanese legal profession: They were called to apply and to teach laws
and legal institutions derived from a legal system with which few of them
had had any previous acquaintance, as the result of extensive changes which
had been wrought in Japanese law under the stimulus or direction of the occupation. This legal reform, which is fittingly termed "bold experiment,"" along
with other equally drastic reforms, had the effect of revolutionizing Japan.
As the problems were immediate and serious, a normal, gradual process of
academic interchange seemed obviously inadequate to overcome them. Hence,
"a cooperative program designed to promote understanding on the part of
jurists and scholars in both systems suggested itself." (p. xvi) The accomplishments of the program are described accurately, and with reserve. I may
add that the work of the program is being continued by the Japanese American
Society for Legal Studies, founded in September, 1964, at the initiative of
the participants of the program.
"The history of Japanese law since the Restoration of 1868 is almost synonymous with an account of the reception of occidental law and legal science."
(p. 37) With this observation Professor Takayanagi, chairman of the Constitution Investigation Commission which has been the center of heated disputes
for the past seven years, sums up his article, "A Century of Innovation: The
Development of Japanese Law 1868-1961." His succinct description of the
history of almost a century's transplantation of Western legal systems and
science into Japan provides a proper framework for the discussion of the postwar influx of Anglo-American legal system and thinking by other contributors.
The shorter course of importation of a finished legal product, instead of
gradual formation of a distinctively Japanese legal system by working on the
old materials of the indigenous law, was dictated by international as well as
domestic exigencies. There was the need to create a unified, centralized state,
powerful enough to repel Western colonialism in the shortest possible time.
"The Meiji statesmen had also to take account of the modern democratic
developments . . . if for no other reason than to ensure the abolition of con-

sular jurisdiction" (p. 7) or of extraterritoriality, which became the national
aspiration in the early years of the Meiji era. I might add that the Meiji government was called upon, from the very beginning, to achieve these twofold
objectives, which were "in a sense antagonistic to each other": this dilemma
is behind those political phenomena in subsequent periods, which often puzzle
Western observers. Both militaristic Japan and her postwar conversion to
democracy, for instance, have their root in those conflicting tendencies in the
formative era of modern Japan.
As regards the postwar constitutional reforms which were inspired primarily
by Anglo-American legal conceptions, the author places special emphasis on
the replacement of the rule by law by the rule of law. Hitherto Japanese
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lawyers and administrators had striven to master the "art of rule by law,"
which presupposes the "authoritarian conception of law as an aggregate of
legal rules imposed by sovereign authority rather than an embodiment of
reason and justice." (p. 38) The principle of the supremacy of law introduced by the new Constitution in 1946 is, then, faced with a formidable
challenge in this old, still prevalent, positivistic conception of law as the command of a sovereign. For the establishment of this principle, the author notes,
"Japanese jurists as well as the nation at large might profitably imbibe the
spirit of common law." (p. 38) Here I shall make two observations. First, the
authoritarian conception of law, which identifies law with expression of superior
power or the organ of rule, antedated by centuries the "introduction of codified
Constitutional law." (p. 38) In fact, the idea of law as the basic rules of
social life dictated by reason seems to have been singularly absent from the
traditional thinking in Japan. Hence, secondly, an effective realization of the
rule of law in Japan requires a profound change in the people's conception
of law, which in turn presupposes a general acceptance of some kind of natural
law, not indeed "any theological or philosophical doctrines of natural law,"
but the natural law which is "the common sensg of the plain man." (p. 26)
The "natural" of natural law signifies primarily that it is opposed to arbitrariness. Without'a recognition of some higher law which is beyond and opposed
to all forms of human arbitrariness, including the one which goes under the
guise of law, the idea of the rule of law will lack its ultimate justification.
The origin of the problem of natural law in modern Japan is to be sought,
as the author points out (p. 25), in Dajokan (Great Council of State) Decree
103 (1875),
article 3, which states: in civil trials, those matters for which
there is no written law are governed by custom, and those matters for which
there is no custom shall be adjudicated by inference from reason (jori). The
idea of jori or dori (right reason) played an important role in the introduction of Western law under the influence of tmile G. Boissonade, adviser to the
Meiji government, who was instrumental in the drafting of criminal and civil
codes. Boissonade's appeal to the idea of natural law seems to have been
motivated by his idea of making the modem codes drafted by him acceptable
to Japanese, by presenting them as an embodiment of reason, rather than
as the historical product of particular nations. Many Japanese jurists seem
to have embraced this idea, recognizing in these modern codes a model of civilized law and justice. Prominent American lawyers in Japan at that time,
notably Henry T. Terry and John H. Wigmore, did not hide their disdain of
the idea of natural law. It is an irony of history that a constitutional reform
which strongly savors of natural law should be introduced by Americans
about a half century later.
In his essay, "Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan," Professor
Kawashima seeks the principal factor contributing to the reluctance of Japanese people to resort to litigation as a formal means of dispute resolution in
the nature of traditional social groups in Japanese society, for, as he says:
Litigation presupposes and admits the existence of dispute and leads to
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a decision which makes clear who is right or wrong in accordance with
[universalistic] standards that are independent of the wills of disputants. Furthermore, judicial decisions emphasize the conflict between
the parties, deprive them of participation in the settlement, and assign
a moral fault which can be avoided in a compromise solution. (p. 43)
The basic principle of social ordering in Japan is "harmony," or a harmonious
social tie, which abhors dispute and condemns litigious men as morally wrong,
subversive and rebellious, regardless of their cause. Social groups, not only
village community and family, but even contractual relationships, are hierarchical, a characteristic which formally forecloses disputes within themselves.
Relationships between people generally have been "paternalistic" and "functionally diffuse," characteristics which again are incompatible with judicial
procedure which clearly defines, in universalistic terms, the rights and duties
of the parties concerned. Consequently, the preferred means of settling disputes has been the one in which the solution is, or at least is pretended to be,
reached through agreement by both parties. Nobody is condemned or vindicated in clear-cut decision. Harmony is restored as if no dispute had ever
existed. Thus, the basic form of dispute resolution in the traditional culture
of Japan is the "extrajudicial means of reconcilement, that is, the process by
which parties in the disputes confer with each other (often through the mediation of a third person) and reach a point at which they can come to terms
and restore or create harmonious relationships." (p. 50)
To confirm his thesis, the author refers to the fact that even today the
prevailing method of group decision is that of unanimous consent, rather than
the majority rule as in most other modem societies, because "there is a strong
expectation that a dispute should not and will not arise." (p. 44) Another
instance that supports this thesis is the fact that there have been and are many
litigations outside of social groups, where harmonious relationship is precluded from the beginning, as, for example, in the relationship between
usurer and his debtor, or between employer and employee. The third fact
which indirectly supports the author's contention and which may interest
Western readers is the absence of distinction between mediation and arbitration: "as the third person who intervenes to settle a dispute is supposed to be
a man of higher status than the disputants, his prestige and authority are
sufficient to persuade the two parties to accept the settlement." (p. 50)
As the author points out, there is some rational calculation behind the
dominance of private, informal means of dispute settlement. The compensation awarded by the court gives the plaintiff just as little as, or quite often less
than, what he would obtain through extrajudicial means, as a survey of litigation in traffic accident cases indicates. Consequently, "who would resort to
a lawsuit ...except pugnacious, litigious fellows?" (p. 49) Here is clearly a
problem for the court and legal profession in general of Japan. As a result of
the disappearance of hierarchical order from Japanese society, the author
notes, on the other hand, the number of lawsuits is expected to increase, one
indication being the large number of disputes brought to the Family Courts
in the postwar era. (p. 58) To what extent this trend is to be attributed to
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social disintegration, and to what extent to the increasing awareness of the
rights and dignity of the individual human person, is both a difficult and
decisive question. Whereas the Japanese have been traditionally quite zealous
in maintaining harmonious social order, there has generally been little sign of
reflection on the ultimate end or value for the attainment of which the harmonious social order is a necessary condition. Harmony possesses undoubtedly
some intrinsic value in itself. It is not, however, the ultimate, absolute value.
I suggest that the distinctive characteristics of the Japanese social attitude are
the lack of concern for absolute value and the insistence on order or harmony
for its own sake.
Through the postwar Civil Procedure reform, promoted by the personnel
of the American occupation, judges were stripped of their leading role and
were made to play the role of umpire in a contest between two adversaries. The
late Judge Tanabe's paper, "The Process of Litigation: An Experiment with the
Adversary System," is an attempt to answer the question whether this procedural
experiment is going to succeed in Japan, by reflecting on thirteen years' experience of Japanese legal profession with this newly introduced procedure. There
is, on the one hand, a pessimistic view as to the future of the adversary system.
A reaction set in after the initial acceptance of the idea, and confusion was
caused by judicial restraint coupled with the insufficient skills of counsel. The
pessimists argue that the Japanese bar lacks the capacity to make the adversary system work, and urges the restoration of the court's clarifying function
which relieves the lawyers from the burden of pretrial investigation of fact
and law. Opposed to this view is an exaggerated and idealistic one which
demands a drastic minimization of clarification, depriving trial judges of their
directive power completely. According to the author, neither of these extreme
views is practicable and desirable. Instead, he recommends a middle path
which combines the continental and the Anglo-American conceptions, and to
which trial judges are said to be in fact "steadily gravitating." (p. 95) This
middle path insists on utilizing the skill and knowledge of the judge "to
-assure that the case will develop in a proper and fair way," guarding at the
same time against "an overly paternalistic exercise of the clarifying function."
It emphasizes, on the other hand, the responsibility of the litigant and his
lawyer for the development of the case of defenses. This midway position is, in the words of the author, a fusion of the continental and the AngloAmerican philosophies in a real sense. It has the advantage of "utilizing the
capacity of the judges without putting an undue strain on the potential capacity of the lawyers." (p. 110) The author believes that the "unique Japanese
experiment will ultimately contribute a new workable pattern which will be
of benefit to all procedural systems." (p. 111) I may add that to the extent
that this vision materializes, we shall witness the emergence of a procedural
law which can be called distinctively Japanese.
Judge Hattori, in discussing the origin and development of the modem
Japanese legal profession, in its three branches, judiciary, procuracy, and
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private practice, points out the inferior estimate accorded to the last branch.
It was only after 1923, for example, that the lawyers were required to pass the
same examination as the judges and procurators. The postwar legal reform
did much to elevate the status of the Japanese bar. The scope of a lawyer's
activity was enlarged through new legislation (for instance, the adoption of the
adversary system); autonomy as to the screening, enrollment, and the disciplinary action was gained; and the training system for lawyers was merged
with that of judges and procurators.
The author refers to a curious paradox in the Japanese legal profession. The
public makes relatively little use of lawyers for the reasons mentioned in Professor Kawashima's essay, while lawyers are too busy to give proper attention to
many legal matters. This paradox presents itself in a kind of vicious circle.
The shortage of lawyers makes legal consultation inaccessible for the general
public, which in turn causes the increase of disputes that could easily be
avoided. Overloaded courts and overworked lawyers are unable to meet
public expectation in the administration of justice. Thus the disappointed public
feels justified in seeking extrajudicial, nonlegal settlement. The key to this paradox is, according to the author, the assumption entertained on the part of the
Japanese legal profession that a "significant expansion in numbers is neither
necessary nor desirable." (p. 147) There are several reasons why the size of
the Japanese bar has been very small. One reason is the fact that those functions which will be best handled by lawyers have been, and are, for the most
part performed by nonlawyer specialists. Another is that "lawyers themselves
often have opposed, or at least have been reluctant to see, an increase in the
size of the bar for fear of excessive competition." (p. 145) This negativistic
attitude is untenable, according to the author, in view of the roles which the
new Constitution formally assigns to Japanese lawyers. The first necessary step
toward the solution, he suggests, is that a "sufficient number of highly competent individuals be attracted to the profession." (p. 148)
What is the criterion, I might ask, to determine the "sufficient number"?
How may outstanding individuals be "attracted" to the profession? Economic
prospect is not an answer. "The spirit of the 1946 Constitution," mentioned
by the author, I submit, is too vague to be an adequate criterion or an effective
source of inspiration. What is needed is a "collaborative articulation" of the
vision of social life and its various functions, something distinctively Japanese.
In the essay titled "Education of the Legal Profession in Japan," Judge
Abe discusses the legal training given to legal apprentices by the Legal Training
and Research Institute, which may be considered the Japanese counterpart
of an American law school. The Institute, founded in 1947 as an agency of the
Supreme Court of Japan, "did not result from positive suggestion of the occupation authorities, but is entirely the independent, original conception of the
Japanese legal profession." (p. 155) At present, it is the sole source of supply
for the Japanese legal profession, with about 350 graduates a year, selected
by a national legal examination from about 8,000 university graduate students.
As the objective of the Institute is to supplement and complete the legal

NATURAL LAW FORUM
education at a university law department, which is more like an American
undergraduate political science department, Judge Abe makes a critical survey
of the latter. The legal education at these law departments, with their almost
exclusive interest in a general knowledge of the content and interpretation of
the so-called "Six Codes," "does not impart legal knowledge at a professional
level or capacity for legal thinking of a professional character." (p. 161) What is
worse, the postwar educational reform has tended to lower the academic standard of Japanese universities. The national legal examination, which in some
way supplements the university legal education, at the same time distorts it,
for the average university graduate has to make about five trials before he
passes the examination; and five years of study wholly geared to the passing of the
examination are far from an ideal type of legal education. In conclusion the
author observes that the most important'issue now confronting those engaged
in Japanese legal education is the "problem of reconstructing legal education in the broadest meaning of the term, in such a way that it will be brought
into better balance with the size and composition of the profession." (p. 185)
Judge Abe makes significant remarks concerning the transformation of the
image of a lawyer in postwar Japan. Whereas members of the legal profession
in the prewar period were supposed to be a "body of legal (or procedural)
technicians," today they are expected to be the ultimate protector of human
rights. Not a narrow professionalism, but leadership and statesmanship are
required for them. In this connection, the author emphasizes the need of
knowledge in the field of "politics, economics, labor and administration." (p.
173) I would rather suggest that what is at stake here is what Professor Lon
Fuller terms "the internal morality of law."1 The basic requirements which
are necessary for a law in order to be a law in a true sense are not neutral to
morality, in that they presuppose a definite idea of man. Hence the law
cannot be considered as a mere organ for the perpetuation of status quo. It
follows that a lawyer -annot remain indifferent to the objectives of law. I
submit that what the Japanese legal profession needs is philosophy, in the
sense of deep reflection on such basic issues as the relationship of law and
morality, more than those disciplines mentioned above.
The new Japanese Constitution legalizes the doctrine of the rule of law in
two ways: by explicit provision of fundamental rights; by the institution of
judicial review, inspired by American constitutional law. The theme of Professor Ito's paper, "The Rule of Law: Constitutional Development," is a
critical evaluation of the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Japanese courts with a view to the proper balance between the rights of the individual and the public welfare. The analysis is clear and confident, as may be
expected from the author of Freedom of Speech and Press, which received the
award of the Japan Academy (1960). Professor Ito is not, however, sanguine
about the future of this institution, for, as he says, "it would seem that there
are many difficulties to overcome before the power of judicial review, transplanted by the new Constitution, can grow up on the soil of Japan." (p. 238)
'FULLER, THE MORALITY oF LAw 33 (1964).
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This caution is motivated by the court's "simplistic logic" and its presumption
that the necessity of maintaining peace and order is superior to the individual's
exercise of basic rights and freedoms. This is the fundamental problem of
social philosophy, which has been widely discussed in postwar Japan. No simple
formula suffices for the solution of this problem. I would suggest that the
prevalent individualistic interpretation of human rights makes a theoretical
solution of this problem impossible, because the demand of the whole and that
of part will remain incompatible in principle from that viewpoint. Finally,
the author does not explain how the principle of the "sovereignty of the people," which he identifies as "a principle of the first importance in the Japanese Constitution" (p. 213), can be reconciled with the idea of the rule of law.
If the people are sovereign, how can they be subjected to the law?
In his paper, "The Rule of Law: Some Aspects of Judicial Review of
Administrative Action," Professor Hashimoto discusses in what way the courts
may "strike the right balance between private rights and the necessities of
government" in their exercise of the power of judicial review of administrative action, conferred by the 1946 Constitution. He observes, in connection
with the question of administrative discretion, that the courts, by excessive
self-restraint, should not refuse and thus deprive individuals of judicial remedies. He warns, on the other hand, that the maximization of judicial review
may not always result in the right balance. He advocates, rather, a flexible,
dynamic approach to this problem. Obviously the course suggested by the
author does not dispense with the need of clarifying certain basic principles.
Thus the same problem remains as in Professor Ito's paper.
The characteristics of the Japanese criminal law are identified (in "The
Accused and Society: Some Aspects of Japanese Criminal Law") by Professor
Hirano as "restraint in the sense of a consciousness of practical limitations
on the law's effectiveness, and subjectivity in the form of pronounced
emphasis upon the defendant's moral blameworthiness." (p. 290) The first
feature, which derives from the underlying character of traditional Japanese
culture, is illustrated by the extremely objective standard in assessing the criminality of an action. In this connection, it is interesting to note that "a large
number of acts, particularly those involving sexual crimes and crimes against
the family, such as homosexuality, incest, and adultery, fall outside the bounds
of criminality in Japan, although they are widely punished in Europe and
the United States." (p. 280) The law's "extremely lenient attitude" towards
abortion, not without criticism from various quarters here, is another noteworthy example. The second characteristic, which is apparently incongruous
with the first, the author observes, can be explained by the patriarchal role
assumed by the Meiji government.
Mr. Nagashima's discussion of the major difficulties in the administration of
criminal justice in Japan ("The Accused and Society: The Administration
of Criminal Justice") is focused on the "very wide discretionary power" granted
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to the public procurator. In spite of various proposals to restrict it, the author
observes that "the traditions of procuracy in Japan are firmly rooted, and the
public reliance on the discretionary power of procurators will not soon change."
(p. 304) His discussion of the past history of the jury system and its future
in Japan may be of interest to others. The jury system introduced in 1923 was
suspended in 1943. One reason why this system did not thrive in Japan is that
98 per cent of the accused waived trial by jury, assuming that the jury would be
harsher than the judge. The author predicts that while it is not likely that the
jury system will be reinstituted in Japan in the near future in view of the
public reliance upon the trial by judge, with the progress of the transition
from the inquisitorial to the accusatorial process in the administration of criminal justice, the road will be opened to the introduction of the jury trial. (p. 321)
Procurator Abe's essay, "The Accused and Society: Therapeutic and Preventive Aspect of Criminal Justice," analyzes the unique phenomena of judicial
leniency in Japan. In addition to the general leniency of the Japanese mentality towards offenses against human dignity, "certain personality attributes
cultivated in the social milieu of the Japanese legal profession contribute to this
leniency." (p. 337) Although such leniency is usually motivated by a deeper
insight into the real cause of crime, professional calmness and objectivity, and
other virtues, the danger of sentimentalism and misled idealism is not excluded.
The author's verdict is that "judicial leniency without scientific basis amounts
to an evasion and abdication of judicial function." (p. 338)
While I can understand the author's appreciation of the cooperation derived
from psychiatry, psychology, and sociology in the furtherance of the crime prevention program, I fail to comprehend his vision when he observes that the
future function of the criminal law will be that of "coordinator among sciences." (p. 359)
As Professor Watan the points out in his paper, "The Family and the Law:
The Individualistic Premise and Modem Japanese Family Law," the traditional family system was closely tied with the old regime, and the postwar
collapse of the latter entailed the distintegration of the former. In discussing the
impact of postwar reform of family law upon Japanese society, the author emphasizes the diversity of contemporary Japanese attitudes towards the individualistic principle of equality, which is the premise of the reform, relative to
age, locality, income and other factors.
The evolution of the law of motor vehicle accident liability, presented in
Professor Kato's essay, "The Treatment of Motor-Vehicle Accidents: The
Impact of Technological Change on Legal Relations," is indicative of the
process of social transformation, involving the interplay of Japan's traditional
mores, accelerated technological and economic progress, and humanitarian ideas
of Western origins. Professor Kato observes that the Automobile Damage Compensation Security Law (1955) has, "with all its shortcomings (notably the
unduly low insurance coverage and government compensation), assisted persons
suffering injuries." (p. 417) The author notes, in conclusion, that this law
will eventually help to liberate Japanese legal thinking from its exclusive inter-
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est in theoretical problems, and will induce it to direct its attention to concrete
issues and practical matters.
Professor Ishikawa's paper, "The Regulation of the Employer-Employee
Relationship: Japanese Labor Relations Law," exposes the perplexing issue
of the legality of "acts of labor disputes" (p. 444), that is, the fact that acts
which in other circumstances would be deemed illegal, under criminal or civil
law, or both, have been viewed as permissible within the context of labormanagement strife. These acts, or labor union tactics, which are sheer expressions of physical strength, often indistinguishable from violence, are justified by
militant scholars inspired by the ideology of class struggle in the name of necessity. Another curious feature of the postwar labor legislation is a provision
(applicable only to employers) forbidding improper labor acts. The author
concludes with a note of warning directed towards an ideology-tinted approach
which obstructs genuine understanding of the real problems and of the labor
union movement with its strong power consciousness. It is hoped that the
author's appeal to management and labor to pay closer attention to procedures will have sobering effects. The establishment of fair procedures is the
only way leading to mutual trust.
Of the remaining four essays I can only list their titles: Kanazawa, "The
Regulation of Corporate Enterprise: The Law of Unfair Competition and the
Control of Monopoly Power"; Michida, "The Legal Structure for Economic
Enterprise: Some Aspects of Japanese Commercial Law"; Yazawa, "The Legal
Structure for Corporate Enterprise: Shareholder-Management Relations Under
Japanese Law"; Uematsu, "Computation of Income in Japanese Income Taxation: A Study in the Adjustment of Theory to Reality."
There is no extensive discussion in this book, of the most controversial constitutional issue in recent years. It is the problem of Article 9 (of the 1946 Constitution), which provides for the renouncement of war and arms, thus giving rise
to the problem of constitutionality of the Self-Defence Force. While this absence is understandable in view of the editorial inclination towards concrete
problems, a chapter on this article would not be out of place in a book on Japanese law, because of its uniqueness and its importance in the shaping of policies
and ideology in postwar Japan.
The legal order, or the rule of law in Japan, is still in an inchoate stage. A
modern legal system that is distinctively Japanese is still in the making. In order to
make it a reality, not merely a technical elaboration, but also the creation of vision
and a public consensus which is the basis and prerequisite of a legal system are
urgent. Such consensus would make anachronistic the prevalent ideological
conflict, now a major threat to the establishment of legal order. This book
presents a challenge to the Japanese reader to build a legal system which is distinctively Japanese. At the same time it is an excellently informative account of
the present state of the system for foreign readers.
B.
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His GOVERNMENT: AN EMPIRICAL THEORY OF POLrrIcs. By Carl
J. Friedrich. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1963.
Pp. xiii, 737. $9.95.

MAN AND

What can one say of a book such as this? What adjectives or nouns should
describe it? Nearly 700 closely packed pages give the author's opinions on the
state-that is, society politically organized- and Government- that is, the
state's machinery which men run to rule themselves and their fellow men. There
is ample quotation of the political philosophers of all ages. (A good many
contemporary writers on government ignore political theory or argue that it is
irrelevant. I sometimes suspect that they ignore it because they are ignorant of
it.) Footnotes number more than 1300. Happily they are not kenneled in an
appendix where they are difficult to discover and from which a ret4In to the
text is often more difficult. They are at the bottoms of the pages, where Agnes
Repplier told us they should be- little dogs barking pleasantly at the larger
type that is above. A great many of these footnotes refer us to the author's
published lucubrations of the past thirty years. The bibliography contains nearly
1200 items. Monumental? Stupendous? Authoritative? Encyclopedic? If one
prefers nouns the two most fitting that occur to me are from languages other
than English: 'tour de force and magnum opus. A work such as this demands
something more than a traditional review. The admiring and critical reader
will find that his perusal raises questions and stimulates reflections. I proceed
to discuss some reflections that have entered the mind of the present reviewer.
If what is said seems banal or unimportant this is because the reviewer has not
risen to the occasion and not because Friedrich's text has failed to be stimulating.'
I
Friedrich begins by quoting the first two lines of Sonnet 30 by Shakespeare:
When to the sessions of sweet silent thought
I summon up remembrance of things past,
and some readers will ask themselves whether he debated and decided against
quoting the two following lines:
I sigh the lack of many a thing I sought,
And with old woes new wail my dear time's waste.
The intention is to "review and summarize the political experience of mankind
in order to see whether it does not yield some fairly general conclusions about
what contributes to political order and the good life and what detracts from
these universal goals." This is "as much needed a task as it is a foolhardy one
to undertake." A first chapter deals with "The Theory of Politics as Human
Experience," and its text is the subtitle of the book, "An Empirical Theory of
Politics."
Many academic writers on government now announce that they are "em-
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piricists" or that their approach is "empirical." They rarely pause to define
their terms precisely.'
On succeeding to The London School of Economics' Chair which had been
occupied by Graham Wallas and Harold Laski, Michael Oakeshott delivered an
inaugural lecture, "Political Education" (1951). There followed a debate by
British students of politics that was spirited, admiring, and critical.
"In the understanding of some people," Oakeshott said,
politics are what may be called an empirical activity. Attending to the
arrangements of a society is waking up each morning and considering, "What
would I like to do?" or "What would somebody else (whom I desire to
please) like to see done?" and doing it. This understanding of political
activity may be called politics without a policy. On the briefest inspection
it will appear a concept of politics difficult
to substantiate; it does not look
2
like a possible manner of activity at all.
Two passages in the inaugural lecture have become famous:
In political activity, then, men sail a boundless and bottomless sea; there
is neither harbour for shelter nor floor for anchorage, neither starting-place
nor appointed destination. The enterprise is to keep afloat on an even keel;
the sea is both friend and enemy; and the seamanship consists in using the
resources of a traditional3 manner of behaviour in order to make a friend
of every hostile occasion.
And
The more profound our understanding of political activity, the less we
shall be at the mercy of plausible but mistaken analogy, the less we shall be
tempted by a false or irrelevant model. And the more thoroughly we understand our own political tradition, the more readily its whole resources are
available to us, the less likely we shall be to embrace the illusion that in
politics we can get on without a tradition of behaviour, the illusion that the
abridgment of a tradition is itself a sufficient guide, and the illusion that in
politics there is anywhere a safe harbour, a destination to be reached or even
a detectable strand of progress. "The world is the best of all possible worlds,
and everything in it is a necessary evil." 4
Oakeshott appears in the Friedrich bibliography and is cited in several foot'I quote the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary:
Empirical
1. Med. Based on, or guided by, the results of observation and
experiment only.
2. That practices physic or surgery without scientific knowledge;
quack, 1680.
3. gen. That is guided by mere experience, without knowledge of
principles. Often transf from 2: charlatan. 4. Pertaining to or derived
from experience.
"An empirical law, then, is an observed uniformity, presumed to
be resolvable into simplex laws, but not yet resolved into them." Mill.
2 MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 114 (London,
1962).
3Id. at 127.
4Id. at 133.
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notes. It would have been interesting if the American had paid his severely
critical respects to the Englishman's inaugural lecture.
II
Reading Friedrich (and Oakeshott) suggests a caveat that I have made
several times before. 5 "Define your terms, you will permit me again to say, or
we shall never understand one another," wrote Voltaire. Dr. Johnson once
said of Poll Carmichael: "I never could persuade her to be categorical." The
felicitous essayist, F. L. Lucas, has complained of "a type of philosopher who
from a sound instinct of self-preservation consistently refuses to illustrate his
meaning by examples." The Yale philosopher, Brand Blanshard, made the same
complaint at greater length in his lecture "On Philosophical Style." I do not
know whether philosophers have obeyed his injunction, but academic writers on
politics certainly have not.
Blanshard tells us that "most men's minds are so constituted that they have
to think by means of examples: if you do not supply these they will supply them
for themselves and if you leave it wholly to them they will do it badly"; or, I
add, they may not be able to do it at all. "On the other hand, if you start from
familiar things, they are quick to make the necessary generalizations." Or, as
Frederic William Maitland told us, "People cannot understand old law unless
you give a few concrete illustrations: at least I can't," and Maitland was a
"royal intellect" of the Victorian era. Without more "concrete illustrations,"
those who do not have "royal intellects" will have difficulty in understanding
what Friedrich really has in mind. In one of his casual speeches, Mr. Justice
Holmes made this remark: "I dare say that I have worked off my fundamental
formula on you that the chief end of men is to find general propositions, and
that no general proposition is worth a damn." Or, as A. J. Carlyle, the coauthor of a very learned history of medieval political theory, put it: "All generalizations are wrong, gentlemen, even this one. . . ." There are many sections
of Man and His Government which could be cited to illustrate the point made
by Voltaire, Blanshard, et al. I first choose Friedrich's discussion of bureaucracy.
III
Less than a year after she had attended to her first official business and had
asked, "Now Mama, am I really Queen?" the young Victoria read a dispatch
from one of her ambassadors who reported that the permanent officials of the
Prussian Foreign Office were espousing a particular policy. She wrote to her
Foreign Secretary and asked how it was that on the Continent such a class of
persons could exercise more power and influence than the corresponding class
of persons could exercise in England. This inquiry was a text on which Lord
Palmerston delivered a short lecture to his Queen (February 25, 1838).
In England, he explained, the ministers had to make daily defenses of them5 Most recently in This Is Where I Came In; An Autobiographical Indiscretion, in
ROBERT H.

1965).
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selves in Parliament. Hence they must be "minutely acquainted with all the
details of the business of their offices." On the Continent, ministers were not
liable to be called to account and they therefore could leave details to undersecretaries and chief clerks. Lord Palmerston thought that save on important occasions the foreign ministers of the principal European countries rarely took the
trouble of writing their own dispatches.
"Your Majesty," wrote Lord Palmerston,
will easily see how greatly such a system must place in the hands of the
subordinate members of the public department the power of directing the
policy and the measures of the Government; because the value and tendency,
and the consequences of a measure, frequently depend as much upon the
manner in which that measure is worked out, as upon the intention and
spirit with which it was planned.
On the Continent, furthermore, the undersecretaries were more permanent
than in England. There, when the heads of departments changed, the undersecretaries changed also; the latter who had come in with their chiefs were no
less junior in experience. An undersecretary, therefore, "can seldom set up his
own knowledge to overrule the opinion, or to guide the judgment, of his superior."
On the other hand there were
in all the public offices abroad a number of men who have spent the greater
part of their lives in their respective departments, and who by their long
experience are full of knowledge of what has been done in former times,
and of the most convenient and easy manner of doing what may be required
in the time present. This affords to the Chiefs an additional motive for
leaning upon their subordinates; and gives to those subordinates still more
real influence.
Such conditions made possible bureaucracy which Lord Palmerston proceeded to
explain etymologically.
"This class of subordinate men has," he said,
from the fact of its being possessed of so much power, been invested by the
jargon of the day with the title of "bureaucratic" - a name fabricated in
imitation of the words, "aristocratic" and "democratic," each being compounded of the word "cratic," which is a corruption from the Greek word
"kratos," which means power; and the prefix, denoting the particular class
of society whose power is meant to be expressed. Thus "aristo-cratic" is
the power of the upper, or, as in Greek it is called, the "aristos" class of
society; "demo-cratic" is the power of the people, which in Greek is called
the "demos"; and "bureau-cratic" is the power of the public offices of
"bureaus," for which latter the French name has been taken instead of a
Greek word.
Let us hope that the Queen was satisfied, but if Lord Palmerston's distinction
was then a reasonably clear one, it soon became cloudy. In Great Britain permanent nfflcials became undersecretaries, and the excellence of the permanent
staff made it unnecessary for the ministers to work too hard in learning the business of their departments. They could be amateurs who relied on the knowledge
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of the professionals. Thus when Lord Randolph Churchill was Chancellor of
the Exchequer he was puzzled by some figures which a clerk was explaining to
him. The latter said that he had reduced the figures to decimals. "Oh," said
Lord Randolph, "I could never make out what those damned dots meant." In
his life of his father, Winston Churchill faintly denies the story by saying that
the remark was made "only-to tease."
Another British statesman, Sir William Harcourt, declared that the country
could be admirably governed by permanent officials for a year or so without
their decisions being interfered with by the political heads but that then the
public would hang the civil servants to the nearest lampposts. "The value of
the political heads of departments," he declared, "is to tell the permanent officials what the public will not stand." Despite constantly growing powers of
the civil service, England never developed a corps of administrators who could
be called a bureaucracy in the sense that the word was employed in connection
with Prussian administration.
Friedrich has some interesting but general remarks on "Busoga bureaucracy"
and on the bureaucracies in India, Egypt, and China. But there is little detail
relating to the matters on which Lord Palmerston pontificated. Have certain
permanent undersecretaries of the British Foreign Office been too powerful?
Should others (Vansittart, for example) have been listened to more intently?
It was Macaulay's view, long accepted, that a man who did well in the subjects
currently stressed at British universities could do well in the civil service. If
the emphasis was on Sanskrit rather than the Classics, that would be all right.
Do the tasks of modem government make it desirable that intending civil servants
have considerable pre-entry training in economics and science?
Is there anything in the argument of Professor Brian Chapman that the
French civil service is now superior to the British civil service in two respects:
in excogitating plans for the future and in demonstrating the truth of Sir Henry
Taylor's dictum: "Wise men have always perceived that the execution of political
measures is in reality the essence of them"? Friedrich barely mentions the delicate
and complex issues of civil-military relationships. He says little or nothing of
those governing groups which have been called the "invisible" government.
Sometimes it is thought that anonymity will make for greater efficiency, and
sometimes the anonymity is ordained .by executive and legislative fiats for intelligence services and espionage agents.
But Friedrich is often interesting on points which will not have occurred to
most of his readers. I give two examples:
Officials are punctual in Britain and Switzerland, they are tardy in more
southern latitudes. This seemingly small matter actually is expressive of a
great many other detailed features of official conduct. Evidently it cannot
be detached from cultural context, and such a yardstick as "rationality" is
likely itself to be culturally determined, as it expresses a particular religious
and convictional background which shapes the notion of what reason and
rationality demand.
And
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The behavior of all persons in a particular cultural context is bound to be
moulded by the values and beliefs prevalent in that culture. Thus the
Chinese official, motivated by the doctrine of Confucius and his followers,
will be much more concerned with good manners than the Swiss official,
while the latter, motivated by the teachings of Christianity and more especially
(typically) by a Protestant and Pietist version of Christian beliefs, will be
much more concerned with honesty and duty.
Chacun & son gofit.
IV
In his chapter entitled "Rational Conduct, Organization, and Political Style"
the author asks, "What is style, and more especially political style?" and he
answers that it is "closely related to the preferred modes of political conduct."
It varies not only from country to country
but also from age to age and it is strikingly revealed in the record of conduct
in official business. Style is, as a matter of fact, an important principle of
historical interpretation and of periodization. How styles come into being
is highly controversial, but it would seem that political life has much to do
with it. It provides the setting within which basic changes of experience
occur and take shape. [There is a] genuine problem of style as a concept
for interpreting political and social reality. .

.

. Thus the style of an organi-

zation and indeed any political style is the visible manifestation of its core
values, beliefs and purposes. Consequently the task of stylistic analysis is
that of uncovering and understanding the basic norm as the rationalized
basic experience which characterizes an epoch, a group, or an organization.
Friedrich makes this generalization illumine as well as glitter by giving three examples (if there are other examples of what he has in mind, I have failed to discover
them) : (1) "As the needs for effective cooperation between men from Alabama
and New England have multiplied, their regionally determined personal style of
conduct has had to be transcended by a style now common to an increasing number of business organizations in the United States." (2) "It has been remarked
how different are the styles of, say, the State Department and the Department of
Agriculture." (3) "Thus the 'style' of the American administrative services is
strikingly different from that of European countries, which in turn markedly differ
from each other. These differences are, of course, subtly related to what is commonly referred to as national character, 6 but this category is not very satisfactory,
as the cases of Switzerland and Bavaria demonstrate." There are no (or at least
insufficient) "examples," but to some, at least, of Friedrich's readers, many
examples will come to their minds. Perhaps they will not be the best examples,
but they will be both institutional and personal.
6 Frederic William Maitland described "national character" as a "wonder-working
spirit at the beck and call of every embarrassed historian; a sort of deus ex machina which
is invoked to settle any problem which cannot be readily solved by ordinary methods of
rational investigation." If the sociologists say that Maitland was only a historian, I remind
them of their Pope, Max Weber, who said that resort to the term "national character"
was "a mere confession of ignorance."
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A century ago Bagehot said that the cure for admiring the House of Lords
was to go look at it. If he were writing now, he would say that spectators were
justified in thinking highly of the noble peers who now itch to deal with matters
which they really understand. As the members of one African legislature approach the time to vote they burst in uncontrollable laughter, and hysteria
causes adjournment. Are there other legislative bodies whose observers should
laugh heartily?
The British House of Commons has great pride in itself as an institution and
does not wish to have as a member any man (or woman) who departs from
certain indefinite but generally accepted standards of conduct. A few years
ago a Labour member became persona non grata and an un-member when it
transpired that he had allowed an agent to use his personal railroad pass. His
excuse was that he was short of funds and at Westminster badly needed some
papers that were in the town in which he lived. Perhaps the House of Commons is different now from what it was in Anthony Trollope's day. Then a
member declared that he "would get such a round of applause" as he could
"never achieve in any other way" if, questioned in the House about the murder
of his grandmother, he made it his chief concern that he had let his fellow
members down:
I regret to say, sir, that the old woman did get in my way when I was
in a passion. Unfortunately, I had a very heavy stick in my hand and I did
strike her over the head. Nobody can regret it so much as I do. Nobody
can feel so acutely the position in which I am placed. I have sat in this
House for many years and many gentlemen know me well. . . . Sir, I am
sorry for what I did in a moment of heat, I have now spoken the truth and
I shall leave myself in the hands of the House.
Perhaps the member who loaned his railroad pass did not throw himself
on the mercy of the House, but was arrogant. Members of the House of Representatives need not bother, for it has a different style. Members, even when
convicted of crime, do not have to resign and have been permitted to draw
their salaries until the expiration of the terms for which they were elected.
One reader of Man and His Government was reminded, perhaps unfairly,
of Bagehot's feelings when he was reading Guizot's History of Civilization: "The
principle of Legitimacy, the principle of Feudalism, the principle of Democracy."
One principle grew, another declined, and a third crept slowly on. "The mind
is immensely edified," said Bagehot, "when perhaps at the 315th page a proper
name occurs, and you mutter, 'Dear me- why, if there were not people in the
time of Charlemagne! who would have thought that.'" Men strut through
Friedrich's pages, but there are more political philosophers than statesmen, and
the latter appear rather capriciously. "Le style est l'homme meme," Buffon told
us, and Gibbon said much the same thing by calling it "the image of character."
The styles of statesmen frequently determine the kind of governance man has
to endure. I give some examples but confine them to the occupants of 10 Downing Street.
Of the first Lord Liverpool, Lord Acton said, "The secret of his policy was
that he had none," and a Frenchman remarked that if Liverpool had been
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present at the creation of the world he would have said, "Mon Dieu, conservons
le chaos." The impervious Lord John Russell? He, Sydney Smith said, "would
perform the operation for the stone - build St. Peter's - or assume (with or
without ten minutes' notice) the command of the Channel fleet; and no one
would discover by his manner that the patient had died, the church tumbled
down, and the Channel fleet had been knocked to atoms."
Disraeli, whose political future had not become dimmer when he ceded a
mistress to Lord Lyndhurst, wrote to a feminine friend: "Yes, I have climbed
to the top of the greasy pole." A year later, on becoming Prime Minister, Gladstone confided to his diary: "I ascend a steepening path, with a burden ever
gathering weight. The Almighty seems to sustain and spare me for some purpose of His own, deeply unworthy as I know myself to be. Glory to His name!"
The Right Honorable Ramsay MacDonald, as Prime Minister, so ardently
desired to be a social lion that politically he became a tame animal. In a speech
shortly after Munich, Neville Chamberlain was vain enough to compare himself to the younger Pitt, who had also faced a Europe full of dire ferment. The
severe but accurate reply could have been that he and Pitt had only two things
in common: fathers abler than they and a tendency to gout.
The name of Sir Winston Churchill appears on six of Friedrich's pages. The
first three mentions are identical: "The old imperialist" is quoted as having
said in 1944 that "The Empires of the future are the empires of the mind."
Another quotation of no great significance is attributed to him, and he is classed
with Robert Schuman, Adenauer, Spaak, and Monnet as having played "a
significant role" in beginning to make a new European political order.
In discussing the utility of political equality in "its discovery of hidden political talent" Friedrich says that a comparison of American presidents with English prime ministers would be illuminating and asks: "Is there any English prime
minister to compare with F. D. Roosevelt or Wilson in this century except
Churchill?" My answer is "yes": that David Lloyd George as a war prime
minister is certainly comparable. But I would put the Friedrich question differently. Is there any American president of this century who can be compared
to Winston Churchill? In declining to deal with Churchill in any detail, Friedrich missed a magnificent opportunity of illustrating what political style can be.
Two facets that occur to me are worthy of mention.
Some statesmen while not exactly inarticulate would never have drawn the
jibe that Disraeli applied to Gladstone: "Intoxicated with the exuberance of
his own verbosity." Excessive loquacity is rarely a political asset, but it proved
to be so in Churchill's case. Until he took office in Great Britain's "finest hour"
Winston Churchill had displayed a kind of verbosity which his critics claimed
justified a belief that his behavior in high office would be uncertain and that
he would be impetuous in action as well as impetuous in speech. The hours
of 1940 and of the years until the war was won were hours which called for
rhetoric- rhetoric that would have been far less effective if it had come from
any one of the group of contemporary statesmen whom Sir Winston associated
with him. Peoples that were struggling to maintain or regain their freedom
needed to hear eloquent words that described the aspirations in their hearts.
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They got them from Churchill. Historians will debate the wisdom of some diplomatic maneuverings and of some decisions in the realm of civil-military relations. All the historians will agree that Churchill was superior in declamation
at a time when a stellar declaimer was needed.
I now quote from the Field Marshal, The Viscount Alanbrooke's Notes
on My Life.
As we were leaving Simpson's H.Q., Simpson [Lieut. Gen. W. H., commanding the Ninth Army] asked Winston whether he wished to make use
of the lavatory before starting. Without a moment's hesitation he asked,
"How far is the Siegfried Line?" On being told about half-an-hour's run,
he replied that he would not visit the lavatory but that we should halt on
reaching the Siegfried Line. On arrival there the column of some twenty
or thirty cars halted, we processed solemnly out and lined up along the Line.
As the photographers had all rushed up to secure good vantage points, he
turned to them and said, "This is one of the operations connected with this
great war which must not be reproduced graphically." To give them credit
they obeyed their orders, and in doing so, missed a chance of publishing the
greatest photographic catch of the war! I shall never forget the childish grin
of intense satisfaction
that spread all over his face as he looked down at that
7
critical moment.
V
Friedrich's canvases are so vast that on them his readers are bound to see
what they think are careless splotches, but considering the book's detail there
is really very little that calls for correction. I cite two matters, not because they
are important, but because they permit me to be precocious.
The bibliography has an entry, "Lewis, George C., An Essay on the Influence
of Authority, 1849." This is the first time I have ever seen (Sir) George Comewall Lewis so listed, and the full title of his book is The Influence of Authority
in Matters of Opinion. Bagehot said that Sir George had written "a book to
prove that when you wanted to know anything you asked someone who knew
something about it."
"Old slogans," writes Friedrich, "such as the saying about ambassadors being
'gentlemen going abroad to lie for the good of their country' provide folkloristic
insight [sic] into this complex issue," which apparently is "discipline in organizations" engaged in war or conducting business enterprises. But the definition
of an ambassador was not an "old slogan"; it was a pun made by Sir Henry
Wotton when he explained his remark to James I. The original, a Latin sentence
scrawled in the guest book of a German host, had used the phrase, "ad mentiendum Reipublicae causa," was reported in England, and came to the attention of the King. The age was one of Ambassadors going on special missions
more often than they went to stay in countries, so Sir Henry told the King
jestingly that his English translation would be this: "An Ambassador is an
honest man sent to lie abroad for the good of his country."
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Friedrich could justifiably quote back to me another saying of Sir Henry
Wotton's: "A critic is only a brusher of noblemen's clothes."
VI
Twelve hundred items are in the Friedrich bibliography, which the author
says "is by no means exhaustive. I have omitted many items given in the
bibliographies appended to my other works cited below." One is reminded of
Ortega y Gasset's warning that "if each generation accumulates printed material
at the rate of recent ones, the culture which liberated man from the jungle will
thrust him anew into a jungle of books."
Tens of thousands of pages on political science appear annually in bound
covers. The research, speculations, hypotheses, announcements of new "methods"
of attack that are "potted" in periodicals are truly formidable-and the word
should be pronounced as the French do: formiddble. The quarterly International
Political Science Abstracts (supported by UNESCO) gives its recipients summaries of articles that have appeared in more than 125 journals-35 of them
American, and there are some journals that the UNESCO editors ignore. New
channels of publications spring into existence with frightening regularity. One
who goes to the library to investigate or who looks at the abstracts is appalled
and is reminded of Anatole France's story (Penguin Island) of the French
Minister of War who collected so many proofs of the guilt of Dreyfus that the
floors of the building collapsed and the debris killed some of the collectors.
The Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques in Paris proudly announces
that its library receives 2,000 reviews from which annually between 25,000 and
30,000 fiches are torn and indexed for the use of students. The journals abstracted
or torn from have few, if any, subscribers save libraries and actual and aspiring
contributors. Few of the journals are available even in the university bookstores
unless perchance there is a desire to publicize home talent, and practically none
appear on the newsstands to attract the laity.
In the natural sciences the developments have been even more striking.
Something more than a century ago, T. H. Huxley started a weekly, Nature,
whose purpose was to tell readers with an ordinary education what was going
on in the world of science. "Today," says Magnus Pyke, "it is a trade journal,
far too technical to be read with comprehension by anyone other than a professional scientist, and even then no single scientist will understand more than
part of it."
Fifty thousand technical journals publish annually more than a million
articles, and 100,000 research reports are distributed among those who are
especially interested. "Printing was a long time coming; but now it has started,
like the Sorcerer's Apprentice, there is no stopping it." Much of the writing
by scientists is about experiments they have actually made. We see the results
in our daily life- in transistors, antibiotics, etc. In the field of politics, there
are no comparable results. Little of what is potted in journals oozes out in any
form to enlighten editorial writers, electorates or statesmen.8 Whatever ad81 am, of course, not referring to journals like Foreign Affairs, Political Science Quarterly, Encounter, Commentary, etc.
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vances have been made, for example, in the field of public administration and
whatever setbacks have occurred in the conduct of foreign relations have resulted from intelligence or lack of intelligence- not from new methodologies,
successful searches for "theory," or the discovery of hypotheses, or the construction of models. Donald R. Young, the director of the Russell Sage Foundation,
has said that despite the millions spent on studies of racial tensions, we know
little, if anything, more about causes or cures than we knew before the expenditures began.
When something over a century ago Sir George Gornewall Lewis wrote his
two volumes, On Methods of Observation and Reasoning in Politics, he could
be familiar with everything - even trivial things - that all his predecessors had
written in several languages. When Freeman lectured at Johns Hopkins in the
eighties and President Gilman asked him where he had written his History of
the Norman' Conquest, Freeman replied with some surprise: "Why, in my
own library, of course." When Messrs. Langer and Gleason (authors of The
Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940) get around to chronicling the influence of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff in political matters from 1941 on, they will want to
use a motorcycle: the files with the documents extend for miles.
The students of our students, when they are at the height of their powers (c.
A.D. 2040), and if they happen to be at Yale (for whose library estimates have
been made), will have access to two hundred million volumes resting on six thousand miles of shelves. These volumes will be catalogued in 750,000 drawers, which
will occupy eight acres of floor space.
Morris Bishop, president of The Modem Language Association, recently told
its members that "if publication is a virtue, so is refraining from publishing." He
is optimistic that the flood will recede.
I expect a revolt on the part of overburdened libraries, administrations and
scholars. Foundations, discouraged by the outcome, will be more chary of
demanding publication. Their subsidies may be rather for crop limitation than
for production. Literary research will dwell less on the disinterment of dead
facts, more on the communication of live ideas.
Scholarship, adds Mr. Bishop, should be aimed "not toward the fellow specialist
but toward the eloquent amateur." The Regius Professor of Modern History in
the University of Oxford agrees.
VII
In his brilliant inaugural lecture (1957), "History: Professional and Lay," 9
H. R. Trevor-Roper asserted his belief that history was a humane subject. If this
is true, and I believe it is, then the study of politics, which instantaneously becomes
history, is the study of a humane subject also. Humane subjects, Trevor-Roper
declares, "have no direct scientific use; they owe their title to existence to the
interest and comprehension of the laity; they exist primarily not for the training
of professionals but for the education of laymen." Technical specialization in
respect of humane subjects
9 Oxford: At the Clarendon Press (1957).
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has no value in itself; it owes whatever value it has entirely to that degree to
which it makes those subjects clearer, more comprehensible and more interesting to the intelligent laity. I do not dispute that by a completer professionalism we may arrive at a more perfect knowledge of history [politics] and
literature: I merely state that perfect knowledge may be so fine and so uninteresting that nobody, except its discoverers, will wish to possess it. If we
believe, as I do, that a knowledge of history and literature is essential to a
civilized society, this would be a great loss.
For my part, I agree with Trevor-Roper, but in reading Friedrich's book I
often wondered how far he was in agreement.
LINDSAY ROGERS

NOMOS VII:

RATIONAL DECISION.
Yearbook of the American Society for
Political and Legal Philosophy. Edited by Carl J. Friedrich. New York:
Atherton Press, 1964. Pp. 288. $6.50.

When social processes, particularly the political and legal, are viewed as
processes of decision, many of the traditional concepts used in describing and
evaluating the ethics, art, and science of politics and law are subjected to substantial reexamination. The impact of such a shift in observational standpoint
is reflected in Nomos VII: Rational Decision. Professor Friedrich's initial assumption is that social scientists generally have given inadequate attention to the
problem of rationality in its relation to decision making. In order to remedy this
deficiency, he has here sought from a group of social scientists, political and legal
philosophers, a clarification of the "interdependence of institutions, decisions, and
policy."
Definition and description of "decision" is a minor theme in this volume.
None of the sixteen contributors fully articulate the features of a comprehensive
model of the decision-making process. Neither do they subscribe to a common
definition of "rational." Consequently, neither uniform criteria for making effective judgments nor criteria for evaluating their rationality emerge. Nomos VII
does not offer a new synthesis, but it does touch upon some of the fundamental
considerations that must be taken into account in making one. Throughout the
essays there are frequent references to one or more phases of decision making. If
the analyses, criticisms, and suggestions made in these papers are related to a comprehensive model of the legal-policy decision process, many of the apparently
divergent views presented can be shown to be compatible with and even mutually
supportive of each other. For these reasons, it is best to begin by extracting from
these essays the essential framework of a decision-making model. With the details
of such a framework in mind, it will be easier to demonstrate how such inquiries
may contribute toward the development of useful guides for rational decision.

I. THE DECISION PROCESS
Implicit in the first paper, "Decisionism," by Judith N. Shklar, is a call for a
comprehensive model. In tracing the recent history of political and legal theory,
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she describes as decisionist all those theories in which (1) decision plays a central
part, and (2) rules, norms, or standards for guiding decision are rejected as
legalism. Their current popularity establishes the "fundamental historical reality," she says, "that the formal concepts of traditional thought no longer serve any
descriptive or prescriptive purpose in a social world that has for decades defied
the inherited categories of political theory." (p. 17) Separate decision-making
models have been projected for internal or domestic politics and for external or
international affairs. The purpose of the latter, developed by the strategists (neoMachiavellian power politicians, for example), is to reduce the data of a chaotic
international scene to a set of manageable, orderly variables upon which to base
calculable and predictable moves. The principal emphasis of theorists and practitioners is upon "decisiveness," with little or no concern with who should decide
or the content of the decision. The central element in the national model projected by nineteenth century Romanticists, American Legal Realists, the adherents of the European "free-law" school, and contemporary existentialists - is the
so-called mature decision maker. In both models, the decisionists clearly specify
"the conditions under which choice is made, and . . . the necessity of making
decisions, but nothing is said about the content, purpose, or the validity of these
choices" (p. 16), other than that traditional rules for identifying rationality are
unacceptable. This negative view leaves open, however, questions of the possibility and desirability of a new form of rationality.
These models exhibit several disturbing features. Mrs. Shklar points out
one of them by asking "whether any legal system can survive without some form
of the basic myth" (p. 10), that is, some faith in articulated community goals
as overriding principles or guides for the procedural requirements and the content of decision. The wisdom, indeed the viability, of political thought and
action not guided by commitment to fundamental goals is seriously questioned
in this and several other papers collected here.
Mrs. Shklar, together with some of her fellow contributors, also criticizes the
limited scope of the decisionists' models. For example, those that assimilate foreign policy to strategic calculations, she observes, could hardly cover the routine
conduct of foreign affairs. Such models "have little relevance to situations which
are not crises, in which no spectacular acts of choice are expected, and which are
characterized by the slow, grinding routine processes of politics-as-accommodation." (p. 14)
A more detailed, value-outcome version of decision making is briefly sketched
by Felix E. Oppenheim:
To arrive at a rational decision, one does not start with the arbitrary
selection of some ultimate end and then proceed to the choice of whatever means are most conducive to its realization. Means have consequences
other than the goal, and the negative utility of the former may outweigh
the positive utility of the latter. A rational actor must therefore predict
(with as high a degree of probability as possible) the total outcome of
each alternative action open to him in the given situation. Then he must
establish a preference rank order among these total outcomes. The preferred outcome may include elements which the actor would disvalue if he
considered them in isolation, and it need not include his original, but ten-
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tative, ultimate goal. Intrinsic valuations in connection with rational
choice do not pertain to separate goals but to total outcomes. (p. 219)
Many of these components of the decision process also figure in the thinking
of J. Roland Pennock. "Rational solution," he says,
involves bringing to bear on the decision process a vast array of facts, a
number of complicated lines of reasoning about probable consequences
of the alternative solutions, and a weighing of values that involves a subtle
appreciation of the impact of a particular state of affairs on each of a
number of variously conditioned groups of people. (p. 103)
When decisions are made by a collective body, the effectiveness of decision making
is affected by the peculiar patterns of interaction among the members acting as a
decision-making group, by the manner in which they are informed, and by the
procedures they follow in their various deliberations. Pennock also recognizes
the crucial role of leadership, "official and unofficial, at all levels from nationwide to the most parochial" (p. 105), in identifying problems, analyzing them,
and calculating and proposing solutions in imaginative ways that enlist support.
Four of the elements of decision-making models mentioned by Shklar, Oppenhelm, and Pennock are singled out by Murray L. Schwartz as the distinguishing
features of a paradigm of legal decision. Legal decisions are those made by officials or public institutions created for the purpose, inter alia, of making decisions
that affect the legal status of others. "[Flor a [legal] decision to be recognized as
a valid one, the decision-maker must have followed a prescribed procedure."
(p. 93) The principles or guides or justifications invoked to explain the decisions
are expected to be relevant to the issues presented, and a legal decision, unlike
other types of decision, must proximately affect a legal status or a legal relationship.
Other authors, whose professional credentials entitle them to speak at length
on the subject, do not concern themselves with a model of the decision process.
They concentrate instead upon the rationality of specific phases of decision
making. Paul A. Freund, incorporating by reference justice Cardozo's analysis
of the judicial process,' emphasizes logic, precedent, history, and social utility.
Charles E. Lindblom does not here summarize the model more fully articulated
in A Strategy of Decision,2 and Abraham Kaplan does not explicate here the
politico-legal decision-making model contemplated in his collaborative work with
Harold D. Lasswell, Power and Society. 3 The basic framework of that model,
more recently developed by Lasswell, Myres S. McDougal and others, is evident
in the partial formulations cited above: Who, in what interactions, for what
value goals, using what competences and other bases of power, by what strategies,
makes what kinds of decisions, having value effects on whom?
II. A COMMUNICATIONS

MODEL OF THE DECISION PROCESS

A comprehensive model of politico-legal decision making, taking all of these
'BENJAMIN
2
3

N. CARDOzo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS

David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom (1963).
1950.

(1921).
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variables into account, would begin by eradicating the traditional, artificial boundaries between politics and law. It would view man as a collection of selves and
mankind as interrelated communities seeking through political and legal institutions to achieve harmonious accommodation of individual and collective values.
The most conspicuous feature of the comprehensive process is the territorially
based community within which influential individuals and groups effectively
constitute and maintain a decision-making structure which is regarded by the
members of the community as "official" or authoritative. The ongoing quality
of this constitutive process can be more accurately described in terms of a communications model in which effective communicators project overriding policy
goals, designate procedures for selecting decision makers and creating decisionmaking arenas, allocate power competences, specify limitations upon those grants
of power, and prescribe procedures for their exercise. These communications are
either explicit, formal, written (as, for example, in constitutions, statutes, and
international agreements), or informal, less explicit and customary ("precedents"
and a wide range of official and nonofficial practices). The meaning or content
of such communications is not determined solely by the intention of the communicators, however, and no inherent or plain meaning of the words or practices
employed can give them a mystical meaning, force, or validity of their own. A
communicatiois model requires that an audience attend and comprehend, and
"meaning" is reflected by the shared understanding or belief of communicator
and audience about how decisions will be made and by whom. Given the ambiguities of communication and the perpetual flux of social change, interpretation
and reinterpretation of policy projections by successive communicators and
their audiences are not only desirable, but inevitable.
The decision making engaged in by the community, through its effective
leadership, for the constitution of an authoritative decision process involves the
same sort of intellectual activity as that required of the decision makers so constituted in creating and maintaining a public order. Four interrelated operations,
mentioned by several of the contributors to Rational Decision, are commonly
regarded as essential. They include deliberate consideration of (1) the relevant
community goals, (2) history (past trends) with emphasis upon the analysis of
conditions that appear to account for past trends, (3) the array of alternatives
available, and (4) predicted costs and impact of each alternative in the context
of all relevant community goals.
Under the communications model, the principal goals of authoritative decision makers are to project and to apply policy in conformity with the shared
expectations of the communities they serve about how decisions will and should
be made. The search for evidence of those expectations - the subjectivities of
individual human beings - and the integration of these expectations into decisions giving effect to the community's basic public order goals are their primary
task. Decision makers traditionally have relied upon practices to assist in the
assembly and evaluation of relevant and credible evidence. Many of these practices have been articulated as principles or rules of evidence and procedure, and,
as such, enjoin the decision makers to advert or not to advert to this or that
feature of the decision-making process itself, or to specified variables in the con-
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text of the problem that occasions the decision. Adoption of a communications
model of the decision process entails a reexamination of these traditional practices and principles with a view' toward improving the rationality of decision
making.
III.

GOAL CLARIFICATION

The communications model, incorporating many of the elements of the
decision process which were perceived as crucial by the American Legal Realists,
represents a radical departure from their pessimism in that it focuses upon goals.
Mrs. Shklar recalls that the realists demanded maturity and expertise in decision
makers and rejected traditional guides for decision as myths, illusions, and
clich6s. The criteria for rationality thus expressed were wholly negative, or when
positive, wholly vague. In contrast, the international strategists' doctrine is didactic: "Politics should be a matter of decisions, taken by those who have the power
to make them stick." (p. 11) Their principal concern is with expedient employment of bases of power and strategies in pursuit of a vaguely articulated,
but passionately adhered to "national interest." Like the elitists who preceded
them, they envisage "a limited number of political actors engaged in making
calculated choices among clearly conceived alternatives." (p. 13) However,
unclarified goals and concurrent rejection of traditional guides for decision
reduce the realists' and strategists' models to mere formal frameworks for rational
deciding without any hint of standards for judging whether such deciding is
rational.
As limited in vision and scope as these theoretical models are, however, their
authors do not deny man's capacity for rational action. Gottfried Dietze does.
Positing the imperfection of man and hence his essential irrationality, Dietze concludes that "law as recognized or made by man . . . is irrational, unjust, wrong,

and thus a limitation upon rationality." (p. 87) There is, according to him, such
a thing as a perfect law - one that is not a limitation upon rationality - and he
believes that occasionally, perhaps, "the perfect law may be revealed to men."
However, in his essay devoted to establishing the fact that natural law, customary and common law, codified law and constitutions all constitute limitations upon rationality, he makes no mention of an occasion on which such a
revelation had occurred. Given the assumption of the essential irrationality
of man, Dietze's suggestion that irrationality is on the increase (because of a
decline in the caliber of lawmakers and a radical increase in the number of
laws motivated by human passion rather than reason) is a curious admission
of degrees of irrationality - an admission which should have been the starting
point of a serious essay on guides for more rational decision by admittedly imperfect man.
Charles E. Lindblom's view is less pessimistic than Dietze's, but more limited in
aspiration than that of those who espouse the goal-oriented communications model
sketched out above. Lindblom takes the position that conventional decision
theory, endorsing "clarification of values when they will nevertheless remain
obscure, . . . systematic canvassing of alternative means, when alternatives are
countless, and . . . exhaustive tracking of consequences, when consequences go
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on forever" (p. 227), is beyond man's capacity. However, the level of rationality in political decision making can be raised, he says, without a daring new
political philosophy, by specific calculated adaptations to the discrepancy between man's cognitive facilities and the enormous complexity of the problems
demanding decision.
Abraham Kaplan's opinion of rational man is scarcely more sanguine. He
cites the theory of games, of information, and of decision making, and their
associated techniques and technology as contributors of new insights into the
nature of rational choice, but believes that expectations about their potential
applicability to law and politics should be moderated. Necessary to any theory,
he states, is the determination of what values are sought in political action, but
this is a problem Kaplan "is not yet competent to solve." It is also necessary
for rational decision makers to assume the responsibility of "judging the relative worth of disparate and perhaps conflicting values" (p. 58), but this problem
has not been resolved even in game theory; and it constitutes the problem of
politics. Finally, since values enter into calculations of the probability of the
attainment of certain future states of affairs by alternative courses of action, a
theory of rational decision needs a probability theory for political action more
acceptable than the theories now available.
While Lindblom and Kaplan differ on man's capacity for rational goal
clarification, they both consider the problem as one within the domain of
"rational." Felix E. Oppenheim disagrees. Believing that intrinsic value judgments - such as adoption of the principle of utility as a goal - are matters of
subjective commitment, not of "objective" truth, Oppenheim regards such commitments as nonrational. Rational decision, he says, is concerned with prediction of the total outcome of alternative actions open to a decision maker.
However, there is no criterion of validity in the intersubjective or scientific sense
for the establishment of a rank order among those total outcomes.
Of all the contributors, only Sir Isaiah Berlin takes the position contrary to
the gloomy pessimism and denial expressed by the authors cited above. There
is, he believes, a core of values common to sane human beings, and although
these values do not remain constant in time and space, persons lacking such
values cannot be described as "human." This being so, the "pursuit of, or failure
to pursue, certain ends can be regarded as evidence of - and in extreme cases
part of the definition of - irrationality." (p. 223)
If these were the only observations on the interdependence of institutions,
decisions, and policy evoked by Friedrich's call for criteria of rational decision,
it would be easy to dismiss Nomos VII as an exercise in futility. The reader
will search in vain for a forthright effort to come to grips with the admittedly
tough problems of goal clarification and specification. The purely negativist
views expressed here (that rationality is impossible, that goals are irrelevant,
that goal clarification is beyond man's capacity, that identification of values
sought in political action*is not yet possible, and that commitments to value
judgments are nonrational) are distressing to those who seek some indication
that contemporary thinkers are ready to challenge ancient philosophical stalemates.
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Sir Isaiah's two-page comment on the temporal and spatial domain of universal criteria of the sane or rational man may or may not be supported by an
anthropologist's survey of universal culture traits or by contemporary psychiatric
theory, but it does remind us of some of the interesting questions relating to
decision theory. Shall we adopt the postulate that man seeks to maximize
both conscious and unconscious values? Can we devise a set of categories for
describing such values? Can we rationally commit ourselves to an overriding
value such as, for example, human dignity? Are there rational criteria for the
empirical specification of such a commitment in terms of preferred outcomes in
the social process? These are not new questions. Their novelty resides only in the
fact that they are asked out of traditional context.
Carl J. Friedrich's essay, concerned with reason, rationality, and religion,
places these kinds of inquiries in historical context. What constitutes rationality
in general is by no means self-evident to Friedrich. He conceives, as Dietze
did not, the dichotomous distinction of "rational" and "irrational" to be but
the "unreal" ends on a continuum of decisions in which reasoning has been
involved to a greater or lesser extent. Such reasoning includes explicit relating of means to ends and the "reasoning" implicit in habit and tradition. Philosophers have long busied themselves with questions about how men
decide what is to be done or left undone; but because political and legal decisions are public, and often urgent, some thinkers have made an absolute out
of the decision. In the historical movement from the search for truth to the
critique of reasoning to radical skepticism, the focus shifted to inquiry about
how men decide rather than how they reason upon the grounds for their decisions.. Friedrich is profoundly interested in the historical role of religion in
politics, and regards that role as relevant to theories of rational decision, rational
action, and rational law. In so doing, he takes his stand with those who are
concerned with the substantive goal of human action, which, he says, "leads
to the religious or pseudoreligious sources of human reasoning." To the extent
that contemporary thinkers rely upon purely operational rationalistic scientism
or are involved in existentialist activitism - deciding without any conviction as
to what is right - they run the risk of "surrender to some 'decision-maker,'
whether man or movement, who claims legitimacy on the ground of some species
of inevitability." (p. 196)
The assumption that men share a common understanding of community
goals, however arrived at, does not necessarily augur well for rational decision.
Harvey C. Mansfield explores this theme in an essay on the rationality of representative government. Such government is rational, he says, because it is based
on the opinions of a multitude of men supported by their power and their
reason, and irrational because it compromises the true reasoning of the few
with the inexact reasoning and opinion of the many. Since the seventeenth
century,. representative government has been regarded as "that compromise
which assumes that the inexact reasoning of the people is true enough to form
the basis for the decisions of the government." (p. 199) Given this assumption,
Mansfield believes that it is an easy shift in emphasis from rationality to decisionism. If decision makers assume that the people know the goal or end of
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government, a mere choice often serves as well as a wise choice. "Decisiveness
in government may be sufficient wisdom, as a counterpart to the steadiness of
the people in their desire for security, which is also sufficient wisdom." (p. 199)
Thus, unlike Dietze who, overwhelmed by man's essential imperfection, has not
dared to answer the call for a new approach to rationality, Mansfield asserts
that the multitude's innate rationality in truly important concerns makes the
need for wisdom in choice superfluous.
This unsatisfactory, and occasionally unsettling, lack of consensus on the
need for or possibility of goal clarification in the decision process is offset somewhat by more creative contributions to other aspects of policy making and
problem solving. While they are made by these authors in the context of particular institutional patterns, they are susceptible to more general application.
IV.

THE SPECIFICATION OF GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR DECISION

In accounting for and discounting the effects of the decision maker's overwhelming influence on the decision process, one might say that the principle
of indeterminacy operates in decision making. Observation of the context of the
problem demanding choice includes the self-observation of the decision maker
as a part of that context and as affecting it by his observational and decisional
activity. This being so, guides for rational decision must be directed to the
decision-making process as well as to the social context of the questions to be
decided. Many of the contributors to Rational Decision have addressed themselves to the problems involved in formulating both types of standards or guides.
Others are concerned with only one of these aspects of rational action and
judgment.
Principles that are related to the process of decision are directed toward
the preservation of that process as an effective institutional basis for the maintenance of public order. They call for impartiality of the decision makers and
their explicit identification with the objectives of the several communities affected by their decisions. They remind decision makers of the purposes they
have been designated to serve and of the necessity for maintaining public confidence in the decisional structures of which they are a part. They demand
constant attention to the authoritative process as a whole, calling for appropriate deference to other decision makers. They express community-wide demands for publicly announced reasoned justifications, candidly and lucidly
expressed, and- they specify practices and presumptions deemed most likely to
bring about rationality in decision procedures. Among these are the counsel
of economy of effort and standards for assessing the credibility of evidence.
One of these decisional principles requires the development and use of other
principles that focus on the content and context of particular social policies
to be projected and applied. Occasions for decision, whatever the value impact
of their solution on the community at large, arise in the context of an ongoing
social process. Rational decision requires some contextual guides to aid decision makers in their assessment of the total outcome of alternative choices and
in their estimation of community expectations about what choices should be
made. Many of the elements that enter into the formulation of decisional and
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contextual guides are considered at length by the contributors to Rational
Decision.
J. Roland Pennock is concerned with both types of principles as guides for
legislative decision. Conventionally stated standards, such as those enjoining
legislators to treat like cases alike, to prescribe classifications that are relevant
to some socially approved purpose, and to be responsible to public opinion, do
no more than frame the problem of rationality. They must be specified in
particular contexts. Two of the strategies available for attaining generality,
regularity, and consistency in legislative policy making, for example, are (1) the
enactment of complex, detailed legislation for the ever-increasing complexity of
situations to which it applies, and (2) the delegation of discretionary authority
to administrators. Since neither of these strategies is a guarantee that like
cases will be treated alike or that regularity and consistency will be effected,
rational (and creative) decision calls for the invention of other alternatives,
such as delegation accompanied by "adequate" policy directives. The act of
delegation itself calls for a rational balance of respect for and skepticism of other
decision makers, and appraisal of the entire structure of authority - including
the delegating organ itself. This and other internal practices of legislatures, such
as voting procedures and the justification of its policy acts, demand a comprehensive understanding of the social process as a whole. Pennock observes that
the complexity of the legislative process does not dictate its intractability, for
persuasion, bargaining, and "politicking" are available and can be used to
integrate partialities. Such integrative solutions build community consensus
where there was none before. Consensus formation may also be promoted by
the justifications announced by legislatures if they are presented in terms that
clearly reflect rational calculation of the consequences and a conscious weighing
of the values at stake.
That the contents of such guiding principles are not and should not be identical for decision-making structures specialized to different functions is Margaret
Spahr's major theme. Acknowledging that both courts and legislatures "make
law," she questions whether the criteria of rationality for the two types of decision are the same. From sound but unoriginal premises, Miss Spahr draws
several conclusions about the appropriate roles of legislatures, courts, and constitutional amending procedures, without suggesting criteria for judging whether
their functions are being appropriately or rationally fulfilled. Reason is used
by legislatures in prospective decision making, says Miss Spahr, "in devising the
most effective means for securing desired ends," while courts in decisions that
are characteristically retroactive "best serve justice by using established procedure to assign to each that which is his due under existing law." (p. 161) To
a court, therefore, reason is primarily analysis, analogy, and deduction, not the
implementation of volition. Irrationality of court decisions is best exemplified
in interpretations of the Constitution "in accordance with policy rather than in
strict conformity with the standards of judicial reason." (p. 162) Notwithstanding the unquestioned benefits that have resulted, she believes that the
fluctuating preferences of the Supreme Court of the United States in handling
decisions relating to the American Negro, from Dred Scott to Brown v. Board
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of Education of Topeka, have endangered the status of the Court as the oracle
of the Constitution. The modification of law in the interest of greater justice is
the appropriate function of the legislature. When it is a question of modifying the fundamental law of the Constitution, "all but infinitesimal changes
should be left to the process of Constitutional amendment." (p. 173) A division of decision-making labor exists and is probably desirable in most communities, but Miss Spahr does not explain how and when a court should go about
deciding whether to act or defer to the superior competence of legislatures or
constitutional amending procedures.
The courts have enjoyed a friendlier reception from A. A. Mavrinac. An
examination of recent trends in the handling of judicial discourse in the right
to privacy cases is the subject of his essay. The emergence of the concept of
privacy is an example of the ways in which decision makers introduce new terms
in order to present their decisions "in rational, that is, self-comprehensible and
extracomprehensible, terms." (p. 159) In these cases, Mavrinac says, one finds
an expression of the will to ground the political system and its institutions in
the human being as he develops his potentials in political, social, legal, familial,
and individual systems. Since each of these systems evolved by man for the
expression of his own creativity seeks internal coherence and stability, rational
political and legal decisions are required to protect the development and integration of each and all of them.
The language of the law in dealin, with privacy problems is not the
language of privacy itself, but is rather the language that binds the
private and the political arenas. Freedom of assembly, freedom from
unreasonable search and seizure, freedom to enter into contractual relationships, all such language conveys the bipolar concerns involved. It
presents, that is, in one unified expression the logic of each system involved and represents at the same time a permanent reference point in
the refinement of the nature of each such value system. (p. 152)
This creative use of concept formation also promotes rational continuity of decision in a long sequence by providing new reference points for persuasive justification. By his open admiration for what he regards as skillful and creative
use of persuasive discourse, Mavrinac clearly dissociates himself from the American Realists.
The realists are also rejected by William K. Frankena. They cannot assert
themselves, as they have done and do, unless they inconsistently talk in terms
they condemn. Granted the "familiar arguments against the credulous use of
words like 'good,' 'right,' 'justified,' " Frankena notes that the realist vocabulary
"mistaken," "dishonest," "pretense," "reprehensible," and "self-deceptive"
appeals to claims of intersubjective validity just as much as the terms the
realists so vigorously condemned. If the use of words such as "right," "valid,"
and "rational" depends upon an unarticulated decision to espouse some standard,
point of view, or way of life, and on an implicit claim of a kind of "public
justifiability for one's opinions, decisions, and way of life" (p. 23), such decisions may be arbitrary but not necessarily irrational. "A decision," claims
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Frankena, "is not irrational merely because it is a decision or because it cannot be a conclusion of a logical inference, simple or complex." (p. 24)
Abraham Kaplan does not undertake to condemn or extol the practices of
existing institutional structures. His emphasis is upon more the universal, less
idiosyncratic features of decision making. After all, decisions are made by
people, he says, and it may be "perfectly rational not to be perfectly rational."
(p. 62) Rationality requires that we do not tacitly equate "rationality" with
self-conscious, deliberate, and calculated decisions only. Ultimately, the soundness and acceptability of a decision maker's choice will depend upon his sense
of his own autonomy, his awareness and acceptance "both of the self which
makes the decision and of the consequences which follow from it." (pp. 63-64)
In addition to this need for psychically well-adjusted decision makers, an inquiry into decision making with a view to improving its rationality demands
intensive study of the whole way of working and style of performance of decision-making persons and institutions in order to fix on the genuine locus of
their decisions. Kaplan also directs attention to the need for contextual guides
in the assessment of risk involved in alternative solutions to particular problems.
There is need of serious study of the value of the future, "that is, of how utilities
are affected, by the mere fact that they lie in the future." (p. 59) On a more
practical and immediately feasible level, Kaplan calls for a reduction in the
disparity "between the logic-in-use in rational decisions and the reconstructed
logic which purports to give an account of the process insofar as it is rational."
(p. 60)
This disparity between logic-in-use and the reconstructed logic of legal decisions is the core of John Ladd's interest in the problem of rational decision. His
thesis is that there are types of rationality other than those represented by formal
logic and the scientific method and that a reconsideration of Aristotle's "practical reason" - reason that issues in action rather than belief - may be fruitful
for answering the question of how judicial decisions, for example, can be made
rational. Focusing upon the performance of an act and the legal effects of that
act, Ladd declares that "when the judge renders his decision, he is not asserting a proposition at all. His decision is an action, not the assertion of a proposition." (p. 129) And the reasons for such action include nonpropositional occurrences such as desires and wants as well as propositional premises and conclusions.
To be rational, justifying explanations must take into account the ways in which
both types of reasons affect decision makers' choices among conflicting goals.
The immediate aim of the justifying process is self-preservative: to have the
rationality of the decision accepted by all parties despite the fact that it may
be regarded by some of them as wrong. But the chief purpose is a moral one:
"to treat a rational being rationally, that is, as a rational being, by explaining to
him through reasons why a decision ... has been reached." (p. 144)
Paul A. Freund lodges in courts primary responsibility for rational uses of
legal reasoning in judicial decisions. Judicial creativity, according to him, is
similar to creativity in science: "both depend on seeing new connections, on reexamining postulates, on formulating new statements that promise to be more
satisfying (because more inclusive or economical or fruitful) than the old."
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(p. 117) Much of the success or failure of creative effort depends upon the forms
and manners of the decision makers and the skill with which they echo the
old while disguising the new. Noting that many of the most creative judicial
decisions in the past were highly ambiguous and thus left open for future decision appropriate extensions or limitatioris of an apparently new course, Freund
asserts that rational creativity calls for a careful consideration of the extent to
which a new position should be formulated in detail or left inchoate. Of
course, where judicial creativity may be upsetting to legitimate expectations
in terms of anticipated dislocations as a result of a decision, or where the
subject is more amenable to general prospective legislation, or judicial declarations applicable only to future transactions are not feasible, rationality calls not
for judicial creativity but for deference to other decision makers - those in
the legislative arena.
Freund finds, as have others before him, that observance of Justice Cardozo's
four elements in judicial reasoning - logic, precedent, history, and social utility provides no warranty that decision-making inquiry has been carried on appropriately. Each of these techniques may be exercised in ways that produce rational or
nonrational or irrational decisions. Rational uses of logic, precedent, and history, and rational imposition of order without suppressing freedom, require
impartiality, as well as creativity, on the part of the decision makers. The
"selves" constituting the personality of a decision maker have an important
bearing upon the rationality of the decision process, but an endeavor to offset
an illegitimate bias by self-awareness ard deliberate counterbias also poses
problems of rationality. Such an effort, he says, may well produce counterdistortion rather than neutrality.
Charles E. Lindblom joins with Kaplan and Freund in the demand for
deference to the competence of other decision makers, and calls for special
attention to two other decisional principles: economy of effort and conscious
relation of the problem at hand to the sequential chain of past and probably
future decisions. The specific contents of some of the "economy" principles
violate the canons of what is ordinarily considered to be rational choice. Examples are: "In collective decision-making, do not try to clarify values if the
parties concerned can agree on policies, as they often can, despite their disagreement on values." "Neglect those consequences of possible decisions for
which there exist watchdogs elsewhere in the society who will probably attend
to the neglect." "Cut off the analysis of consequences at any point at which you
yourself can probably at a next step in a sequence of decisions attend to them
if unfavorable." (pp. 227, 228) Unfortunately, the dangerous assumptions
underlying these strategies of expedience and the potential effects on total outcomes of their application were not challenged or debated by the other contributors to Rational Decision.
Heinz Eulau explores a quite different aspect of rational procedures in collective decision making: whether unanimity satisfies criteria of rationality.
Excepting -crisis situations threatening community survival, where unanimity
is the preferred decision norm, he hypothesizes that a "democratic legislature
is an institution composed of opposed sides, and, the more the lines of division
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follow predictable lines, the more rational would the legislative process seem
to be." (p. 29) On the assumption that men engaged in collective action seek
to advance both their individual interests and those of the groups to which they
belong, Eulau develops a typology of unanimity and evaluates the rationality
of each.
The typology is based upon three specified ways of "decision handling" and
two categories of individual and group interest articulation. The former are
described as: (1) highly stable, but weakly institutionalized consensual or informal, traditionally interpersonal procedures; (2) ministerial or formal, impersonal and bureaucratized procedures; and (3) political procedures, which
include elements of both the informal and the formal patterns. Interest articulation is diffuse "if the demands that are made, either by an individual or a
group, do not constitute a hierarchy of preferences which would give priority
in decision-making to one demand over another," and specific, "if the different
demands that are made . . . can be readily located within some hierarchy of

preferences." (p. 39) A six-cell unanimity matrix represents the typology:
Ways of Interest
Articulation

Ways of Decision Handling
Consensual
Political
Ministerial

Group-specific
Individual-diffuse

(1)
Ancestral

(3)
Bargained

(5)
Functional

Group-diffuse
Individual-specific

(2)
False

(4)
Projected

(6)
Injunctive

He specifies the conditions of rationality as follows: "A unanimous decision is
rational if it is made in a situation that has the potential for free choice among
alternate decisional patterns. .

.

.. A unanimous decision is rational if it is

consciously chosen from alternate decisional patterns." (p. 48) To what
extent do these six types of unanimous decision meet the specified conditions of rationality? Eulau concludes that: (1) Ancestral unanimity seems to
be prerational because customary agreement on unanimity as a preferred procedure in making collective decisions precludes the genuine availability of alternatives. (2) False unanimity is "a kind of counterrationalityof fear which deters
individuals from pursuing certain of their interests and which leads them to
act counter to these interests in order to achieve a group interest that is poorly
articulated." (p. 49)
(3) Since bargained unanimity is "good enough" for the
attainment of individual interests (majority voting would be preferable), Eulau
groups it with rational decisions under the label satisfying rationality. (4) Projected unanimity involves the unconscious projection of specific individual
interests upon diffusely articulated group interests and is irrational in the sense
of being accidental or essentially random. (5) Functional unanimity provides
procedural rationality for it is "likely to occur only after alternate decisional
patterns have been consciously eliminated as a result of convincing argument
that the choice to be made cannot be anything but unanimous." (p. 50) (6)
Injunctive unanimity reflects maximizing rationality of individual interests,
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where individuals prefer action to deadlock and continue to debate an issue
and alternate decisional patterns until unanimity is reached.
This essay is unique in its scope and method; it hardly seems to belong here.
This is not meant to be disparaging to the neatly systematic and disciplined
manner in which Eulau explored one of the hundreds of problems that are
raised by the quest for creative thinking about rational decision making. There
are materials aplenty in this volume and elsewhere that lend themselves to
similar treatment. It is unfortunate that other contributors did not undertake
to do so.
If Nomos VI does not clarify the interdependence of institutions, decisions,
and policy, 'as Editor Friedrich had hoped, it does reflect a reaffirmation of their
interdependence. Rational decision is a serious subject and has been treated
solemnly. Seldcm do these essays exhibit intensity or passion, impatience or spirit.
Even opinions that contradict conventional notions of rationality are expressed
with such sweet temperance that one almost overlooks their horrifying implications.
There is no thumping call here - not even a "bargained" unanimity for decisional and contextual principles to guide decision. Yet faith in man's
capacity to increase his rationality and urgent concern that he do so without
delay are recurrent themes in this volume. Felix E. Oppenheim, unwilling to
regard commitments to values as subject to tests of rationality, recognizes that
there is a wide range of problems that are susceptible to rational judgment.
Since we "base our decisions on predictions which fall short of even our limited
capacity for estimating probabilities, compute our utilities on the basis of isolated
goals rather than total outcomes, and cling to incompatible goals" (p. 220),
there is still a large area in which we need further specification of criteria of
rationality.
Whether such criteria can be specified without reference to a comprehensive
theory of politico-legal decision is doubtful. The communications model sketched
out in rough outline above, like all such metaphors, is admittedly incomplete.
It presupposes an articulate analytical framework for the description of the
entire social process of which the authoritative power process is only a part.
Nevertheless, with its emphasis on the continuing dialogue between the rulers and
the ruled, the governors and the governed, it reminds all participants in the
process that they are both actors and targets, communicators and audience.
What may be of even greater importance is the 'act that each of these roles
imports its own ethic of responsibility. If contemporary society is viewed as
engaging in continuing communication with the "founding fathers" and with all
subsequent interpreters and reinterpreters who project community policy, it
is easier to account for evidences of continuity and change. Communication in
any serious decision making includes deliberation, dispute, and efforts to persuade. Facts are adduced, predictions are made, existing policy is appraised,
alternative policies for future interaction are examined, and recommendations
are tendered. Decision - to prescribe, to invoke, to apply, or to terminate policy
- is taken, and it becomes a part of the endless communication by and through
which men govern themselves.
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If, as suggested by some, crucial decisions are and must be made without
benefit of leisurely deliberation, there is an urgent need for institutional practices
that anticipate the demands of "instant decision making." No decision model
contemplates waiting until all the facts are in, all the alternatives canvassed,
and all the future outcomes predicted with certainty. But, as most of the contributions here attest, rational decision requires that efforts be made to approximate such conditions. Thus, the persistence of the call for principles to guide
the grand long-range aspirations of society, to facilitate critical emergency decisions, or to give direction and coherence to the routine choices of appliers and
administrators is justified by its importance. It remains, unfortunately, unanswered by the authors of Rational Decision.
MARY ELLEN CALDWELL

By C. Wilfred Jenks. London: Stevens & Son;
Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, 1963. Pp. xi, 162. $6.00.

LAW, FREEDOM AND WELFARE.

Like some of his earlier works, among them The Common Law of Mankind
(1958), Jenks's book here under review is a collection of contributions to Festschriften (for Franfois,Marikadis, Rolin and Basdevant) and of addresses delivered over a period of four years (1959 to 1963). The book is nevertheless an
integrated whole expressing the author's basic philosophy on some of the fundamental problems of present-day international law and his views of the tasks and
obligations of the international lawyer of our time. In a review of Law, Freedom
and Welfare a learned writer has said that "Dr. Jenks is among us like an Old
Testament prophet, for in all that he writes there is eloquence, moral fervour
and vision." I To a comment made on The Common Law of Mankind, that it
has "the ring of a manifesto" Jenks now replies: "It was so intended." (p. 67)
Elsewhere in the book Jenks says that "the born pessimist, who attempts to reconcile us to his pessimism by calling it realism, will achieve nothing, and may ultimately be taken aback by what the optimists have quietly accomplished while
he has been explaining why it is impossible." (p. 140) "Despair," he emphasizes,
is neither a wise nor a prudent counsellor and a corrosive cynicism is no
proof of either subtlety or statesmanship. The international lawyer's part
in the matter [of the protection of existing legal rights by compulsory
adjudication and the adjustment of established legal rights to changing
political, economic and social needs and views] is not so to compound the
difficulties that they become insoluble, but so to combine moral tenacity
With technical resourcefulness as to make a positive contribution to their
solution. (p. 55)
These sentiments might be brushed aside by the "Realpolitiker who emphasize the inevitable weakness of law and international authority in the face of
I J. E. S. Fawcett, 13
(1964).
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power and the widespread assault on the status quo" 2 if they were conceived in
his ivory tower by a scholar inexperienced in the ways of men. It so happens,
however, that these exhortations are expressed by one of the great craftsmen of
international law, by a man with a unique practical experience of the working
of international organization and procedures, by a "visionary and moralist" who
combines common sense and understanding of what is practicable with an
unequalled mastery of the minutiae of his subject.
The wide range of the book is indicated by the titles of the seven papers
which it contains: "Law, Freedom and Welfare in Action for Peace," "The
Laws 3 of Nature and International Law," "International Law in Times of Stress,"
"Interdependence as the Basic Concept of Contemporary International Law,"
"The Will of the World Community as the Basis of Obligation in International
Law," "The Corpus Juris of Social Justice," and "The Challenge of Universality."
Law almost always lags behind life. The task of the rising generation of
international lawyers is to meet the challenge presented by the change in the
nature of their responsibilities which arises out of the vacuum created by the
disappearance of the empires after the two world wars and the revolutionary
transformation of the world which has taken place. Scholarly exposition played
a major role in the development of international law during the period immediately following the First World War, but in recent years it has been less constructive in spirit. A number of different national attitudes must share the responsibility for the unsatisfactory situation. A negative or hesitant approach to
international adjudication and international legislation has, not been confined
to any one group of states or to any particular school of political or economic
thought. Nor have the international organizations been blameless. Technical
assistance and related operational activities brought about a shift of emphasis
"from law to action" in their work. However, Jenks sees signs of the necessary
balance of law and action tending to be restored. (p. 13)
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 represents, Jenks says,
a major step towards the definition and recognition of the human rights postulated by the Charter. The attempt to express its principles in the form of worldwide international conventions, the "Covenants on Human Rights," has, he feels,
remained unsuccessful. The Covenants, in Professor Holcombe's words, "a
project for a piece of international legislation, more ambitious and perhaps more
important than any other in the history of International Law," 4 have not yet
been opened for signature and ratification. Whether Jenks does not go too far
when he speaks of a deadlock (p. 15) is a matter of opinion, considering that,
by the end of 1963, the competent General Assembly Committee of the whole
had succeeded in completing its work on all the general and substantive articles
of the draft instruments. The author recommends the "piecemeal approach"
which has been so successfully practiced by the International Labor Organiza2 See Oscar Schachter, The Relation of Law, Politics and Action in the United Nations,
I RECUEIL DES COURS 172 (1963).

8 The

chapter deals with the laws of nature, not with natural law.
4 Holcombe, The Covenant on Human Rights, 14 LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
413 (1949).
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tion, i.e., the method of breaking down general aspirations into a series of definable problems and tackling each on its merits. This method, applied to other
human rights and fundamental freedoms, might bear fruit in a series of conventions which are not too rigid and accept the principle of progressive action, thus
making it possible to take advantage of opportunities as they occur. (pp. 58-59)
In this regard, it might be pointed out that the United Nations has been
committed to the idea of enacting an "International Bill of Rights," i.e., a series
of instruments of universal scope and universal application since its beginnings,
and even before the Charter entered into force. It would have been an act of
doubtful merit and, certainly, not one of great popularity for a state or a group
of states to propose the abandonment of the ambitious plan. The nearest approach to such an attitude, the Eisenhower-Dulles policy against "treaty coercion" and against "formal undertakings" in regard to human rights 5 did certainly
not add to the stature of the United States as a leader in the struggle for freedom and welfare. Although it is not mentioned by name, this policy brought
the United States within Jenks's stricture when he describes as discouraging "the
reluctance of certain states to contract international engagements on other matters of vital international importance, including the protection of human rights."
(p. 11) Moreover, ever since they succeeded, early in their legislative history,
in inserting in the two draft Covenants clauses on the right of self-determination
of all peoples, on their right freely to dispose of their natural wealth and re-

sources and on the automatic application of the Covenants to dependent territories, the Asian, African and Latin-American states have fought for the allembracing project as one in which they have a sort of vested interest. As a
consequence of the decolonization which took place in the last few years these
provisions aimed at the former colonial powers will be much less of an obstacle
to the acceptance of the Covenants by those powers than was feared at the time
they were inserted in the drafts by decisions of the majority.
The United Nations has never, either in principle or in practice, rejected the
"piecemeal approach" which Jenks recommends; it has succeeded in putting a
number of conventions of varying importance on the international statute book:
Genocide, 1948; the International Right of Correction, 1952; Political Rights of
Women, 1952; Status of Refugees, 1951; Status of Stateless Persons, 1954; Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and similar
Institutions and Practices, 1956; Nationality of Married Women, 1957; Reduction of Statelessness, 1961; and, last but not least, an instrument regulating a
subject which is essential to the social and economic progress of the underdeveloped world, and of great significance for the goal of human dignity - the Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage, and Registration
of Marriages, 1962. The Convention against Discrimination in Education, 1960,
was adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO on United Nations initiative. In other respects, such as in regard to freedom of information, the
Organization was less successful, although some progress has been achieved even
5 Letter dated April 3, 1953, from Mr. Dulles to the United States representative on the
Commission on Human Rights and statement by Mr. Dulles before the United States Senate
Judiciary Committee of April 6, 1953, both reprinted in "Review of the United Nations
Charter," 83rd Congress, Document No. 87, p. 263 and p. 293.
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there. Freedom of information is a field where, in the words of a more general
statement by the author, "ideological conflict is most apt to be acute and commitments in general language to be illusory." (p. 58) At its 1964-65 session, the
draft of an "International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination" was before the General Assembly of the United Nations. This is
a project which precisely meets Jenks's criterion when he says that "periods of
acute international tension, so far from rendering impossible any progress in the
matter, often create the sense of urgency necessary to give the momentum required for such progress." There is reason to believe that when what Assistant
Secretary of State Harlan Cleveland has called the "hospitalization of the General Assembly" caused by the conflict about the expenses of peace-keeping operations comes to an end, positive action on the draft will be taken.
In 1927, when it decided the Lotus Case, it was still possible for a majority, but only a bare majority, of the Permanent Court of International Justice to
declare that international law regulates the relations between "coexisting independent communities" and that "restrictions upon the independence of states
cannot therefore be presumed." A generation later we are evolving towards a
position in which it is the denial of interdependence of states which "cannot be
presumed." (p. 72) "The concept of interdependence is not an incantation by
reciting which 'everyday problems can be resolved." (p. 81) However, an approach dictated by the conviction that the interdependence rather than the
independence of states is the basic conception of contemporary international law
will lead to results radically different from, 2nd infinitely more constructive than,
those which would derive from an outworn dogma of independence.
In a very important chapter Jenks attempts an imaginative approach towards
an explanation of the basis of obligation in international law, a task which has
perplexed, and divided, legal philosophers and international lawyers since the
beginning of international law. "Can we really expect," he asks,
to find in a postulate which expresses itself in a somewhat trite Latin
maxim [pacta sunt servanda] or in a fundamental norm which, whether
we regard it as a hypothesis [Kelsen] or an axiom [Verdross], is essentially
an intellectual abstraction, a source of the moral dignity, emotional power
and political authority necessary to give vitality to the obligation of international law?
The concept proposed by Jenks, that the basis of obligation is to be found in the
will of the world community, represents "the fruition rather than the rejection
of previous legal thinking,"
a synthesis of rival and apparently conflicting views in which each of
them . . . makes a significant contribution towards a concept which has

the simplicity, the authority and the dynamic quality necessary to establish the obligation of international law in the hearts and minds of the
people. (pp. 88-89)
In one of the chapters (pp. 101 et seq.) the author gives an impressive
picture of the legislative. and quasi-legislative work of the International Labor
Organization, in the service of which he has spent a lifetime and to the success
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of which he has contributed and continues to contribute so much. Influenced,
no doubt, by the genius loci (the paper was delivered at the School of Law of
the University of Bologna), Jenks constructs a parallel between the legislative
enactments which constitute Justinian's corpus juris civilis and the result of the
work of the I. L. 0., which he calls the Corpus Juris of Social Justice. Technically,
there are fundamental differences between the "International Labor Code" on the
one hand and the great civil law codifications of Justinian, and, for that matter, of
Napoleon and the authors of the other great national civil codes, on the other.
While his Bologna audience may have had a sufficient knowledge of Roman
law to perceive these differences, to avoid misunderstanding by the general
reader of Law, Freedom and Welfare, it might have been useful if the author
had elaborated upon them somewhat more than he did. The "International
Labor Code" is a systematic compilation by the Secretariat (i.e., the International. Labor Office) of existing international labor conventions and recommendations which does not add anything to the validity and field of application
of these instruments. Justinian's codex, of which this Secretariat compilation is
supposed to be the equivalent,.was the re-enactment, with additions, modifications
and omissions, of the legislation of the various Roman emperors (constitutiones).

The codex replaced all the previous legislation of the emperors and previous
compilations thereof.
The Digests (Justiniani Digesta), another part of the emperor's codifica-

tion, is also an enactment by the emperor based on, and replacing, the writings
of Roman lawyers who, centuries earlier, had been granted the ius respondendi.
The law set forth by those lawyers lost its status as a source of law and remained
applicable only as re-enacted in Justinian's Digests. No equivalent to this exists
in the Corpus Juris of Social Justice today. Jenks speaks of a prospective digest
gradually emerging which, one day, will consist of a systematic arrangement of
analogues of decided cases supplemented by analogues of law officers' opinions.
Another part of Justinian's legislative work is the novellae, i.e., about 150
laws enacted by Justinian in the thirty years (A. D. 535 to 565) following the
enactment of the corpus juris. They were not made part of the codex. As a consequence, each of them is an independent statute. It is not surprising that
an equivalent to this does exist in the international labor field, and, for that
matter, wherever a codification or a compilation has taken place. The International Labor Code can be rearranged and reissued only at relatively. infrequent intervals, and there are therefore at any given time almost always a
number of conventions and recommendations adopted since the last compilation.
Jenks's novellae of social justice would also include a wide range of international
standards of social legislation and policy which have not been embodied in
conventions or recommendations, as well as regional supplements and standards
for particular industries. (p. 129)
Justinian's institutiones are both a textbook and a law.6 That the corpus
juris of social justice still lacks its Institutes is a matter for neither surprise nor
regret. (p. 130) Almost a thousand years elapsed between the time when the
O"plenissimum nostrarum constitutionum robur eis accommodavimus" (constitutio Imperatoriammaiestatem of November 21, 533).
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Law of the Twelve Tables is assumed to have been enacted (451-450 B.C.)
and the enactment of the Institutes of Justinian (A.D. 533). Jenks submits
that we have been favored rather than unfortunate in the fact that the Institutes of social justice remain to be written. If they had been written a generation or even a decade ago the emphasis would have been quite different from
that which the needs of the future require. They would inevitably have reflected a view of the world projected from the traditional heartland of international labor legislation in Western Europe rather than the more broadly based
and more balanced view which has now become intellectually possible simultaneously with its becoming politically and morally indispensable. Even for
the remote future Jenks does not, of course, consider the adoption of a textbook in the form of an international labor convention and he contemplates
that the time will come "for the Gaian, though not yet [?] the Justinianan
Institutes of Social Justice." (p. 131)
While the parallel between the International Labor Code and the work of
codification of Justinian may be open to challenge on strictly technical grounds,
on the philosophical, ideological, and jurisprudential level there is much that
can be said in support of such an analogy.
Just one hundred years ago Rudolph v. Ihering said about "The Importance
of Roman Law for the Modem World" that "The world-historical role and
mission of Rome may be summed up in one word as the over-coming of the
principle of nationality by the concept of universality." This statement can
certainly also be applied to the impressive Lzdy of international labor legislation of
the twentieth century.
Ihering went on to say about the system of Roman law:
A strange phenomenon! A dead body of law awakening to new
life! A body of law, laid down in a foreign tongue, accessible to the
scholar only, which meets with resistance everywhere in life and yet
pertinaciously forges ahead, finally gaining admittance and victory. What
it had failed to achieve at the time of its operation, of its flowering and
full force: to regenerate the laws of foreign peoples 7- it did achieve
five hundred years later. It had to die before it could unfold in full
vigor. And how it did this! Nothing, at first, but a grammar of law in
the hands of those desirous of learning, it soon rises to the rank of a code
of law, in order, finally - its formal authority having been called in
question and nearly completely rejected - to assume in exchange for
such status the far higher authority of a canon of our whole legal
thinking.
The importance of Roman Law for the modern world does not lie
in the fact that for a period of time it was in operation as a source of
law - in this role, its significance was indeed transient - but rather in
the fact that it effected a total change within, that it has completely
transformed our legal thinking. Like
Christianity, Roman Law is a
7
component of modern civilization.
For the context of Jenks's book one might add that Roman law has been, not
7 RUDOLPH

V.

IHERING, BEDEUTUNG DES ROMISCHEN RECHTS FUR DIE MODERNE WELT

6 (Leipzig, 1865).
ROMISCHEN RECHTS.

Printed also in the second and later editions of Ihering's GEIST DES
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only in the civil law countries, one of the essential elements in the development
of international law.
When read after one hundred years, this brilliant passage sounds, in part,
both parochial and dated: parochial, because the great civil lawyer proceeded
as if the common law system did not exist; dated, because in the one hundred
years since 1865 the principles for which the International Labor Organization
stands - from the regulation of the hours of work and the protection of the
worker against sickness, disease and injury, to the effective recognition of the
right of collective bargaining and the combating of discrimination in employment and occupation - have made an inroad into the "grammar of law" and
have made social and labor legislation, international and national, a no less
important component of modern civilization than Roman law.
Law, Freedom and Welfare shows imagination and sweep; it is a mine of
information on broad developments as well as on many little-known details
of the law; it is an inspiration to those who, as judges, as counsel, as international or national administrators, as teachers or as scholars work in the field
of international law. Only a few indications of some of the questions dealt
8
with in the book in a masterly fashion could be given in this review.
EOON SCHWELB
8 It is a great pity that the printer of so distinguished a work appears to be in a state of

war with the Latin language. The printer communicated with the reader on the Corpus Juris
Justinianus (p. 113); according to him Suarez wrote De legibus ac dea legislatore. (p. 84)
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THE LIFE AND DEATH

OF FRANZ

JAGERSTATTER.

By

Gordon Zahn. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964. Pp. 277.
$5.95.
Professor Zahn here reports the results of a mission somewhat like that of the
English monsignor in Morris West's novel, The Devil's Advocate. In each, the
subject of inquiry was an extraordinary Christian, a man whose example was
largely ignored by the people who knew him best until canonization seemed the
only way for them to catch up. The stories are not, however, entirely alike. The
monsignor had an ecclesiastical commission to study miracles; the professor had
a grant to study behavior, and found no miracles' except an Austrian peasant
who was able to resist literally every tangible inducement to support the Third
Reich.
Franz Jagerstatter was a farmer and parish sexton in the village of St.
Radegund, a part of the same district in Austria which produced Adolf Hitler
(Braunau-am-Inn) and Adolf Eichmann (Linz). He was exceptional, if at all,
only for a somewhat more pronounced piety than the villagers ordinarily thought
necessary for agriculture, and for relatively strong misgivings about the anschluss
of 1938 and the growth of National Socialism, in the fragments in which it was
1 This may be too flippant. Zahn mentions an Austrian nun who said she "had extraordinary help in a spiritual manner through Jagerstatter's intercession." (pp. 106-7)
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manifested in rural Austria. He was married, the father of three children and
the support of his mother.
Jagerstatter was summoned for compulsory military training in 1942, reported
and served an apparently obedient novitiate in the German army. In 1943 he
was ordered to the seat of his diocese, Linz, for induction into active duty. When
he arrived at the induction center he refused to accept service or to take the
oath required of noncombatant soldiers. He was arrested, imprisoned, tried by a
military tribunal for the statutory crime of resisting the war effort, sentenced to
death, and, on August 9, 1943, in Berlin, beheaded.
Zahn first learned of Jagerstatter in Heinrich Kreuzberg's book on another
2
rebel, Franz Reinisch, a priest who was killed in 1942 for resisting the war effort.
With the assistance of a research grant for sociological study (from the Penrose
Fund of the American Philosophical Society), Zahn spent the summer of 1963 in
Austria and Germany assembling the interview notes and sparse documentation
on which this study is built. Because the book can be viewed in several perspectives, it is important to note that it appears to contain virtually everything that
is available on Jagerstatter. Zahn analyzes the results of innumerable interviews
with villagers, chaplains, former prisoners who knew Jagerstatter - virtually
everyone who could be found who had information about him. He adds to
these, in his textual discussion or in the appendix, all of Jagerstatter's writings, a
thin collection as personal papers go, but a remarkable achievement for a man
who, but for Hitler, would probably never have written anything more extensive
than an entry in the family Bible.
The resulting study can be viewed as an attempt to explain the psychology
of this "solitary witness"; or it can be analyzed as a sociological study, with all of
the application of scientific measurement to human life that profession ordinarily
attempts. It can be regarded as an addition to the growing literature on the
atrophy of Christian institutions in "the greater Reich" during the rise and fall
of National Socialism, or, in a more positive sense, as a triumph of conscience
acting outside of those institutions.
The greater part of Zahn's effort was directed to the first of these perspectives. Why did Franz Jagerstatter resist not only the pressures of his government
but the advice of every member of his family, every friend, every priest he consulted, his legal counsel, and the members of the military tribunal who tried him?
One immediate possibility is that Jagerstatter was a fanatic; it was perhaps
easier to make that judgment in Austria in 1943 than it is to make it now at
Loyola University - where Zahn is professor of sociology - but Zahn considers
the possibility compelling enough to justify a good deal of time to disprove it.
The first priest - a temporary curate - to advise Jagerstatter on the immediate issue of induction thought him "thoroughly sound in his approach to religious matters." This was also the judgment of other priests who advised him and
of his defense counsel, all of whom Zahn interviewed. But most laymen who
knew Jagerstatter thought he was too pious - fr6mmigkeit is the word they
used. Fifty-seven of the village's sons died in military action for the Third Reich,
2 FRANZ REINISCH: EIN MARTYRER UNSERER ZEIT (1953),

cusses Jagerstatter's case.

an appendix to which dis-
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these people pointed out, thirty-three of them in Russia. The isolated reaction of
one villager, patently. hostile to this loyal response, was, they thought, best attributed to mental instability. On the other hand, a good many of the villagers
expressed support for Jagerstatter's canonization, because he acted in obedience
to his conscience, and, ironically, Jagerstatter's name is on the village war
memorial; his ashes are buried in a place of singular honor in the churchyard.
A number of motives other than fanaticism are suggested in Jagerstatter's
letters and essays and in the village interviews. He said on several occasions that
he would not support a regime that persecuted the Church - something that
must have embarrassed the clerics who, when National Socialism was no more
than a political party, had denied communion to its adherents, but who found it
possible to advise loyalty after the party began winning elections. He also told
more than one person that he refused to enter the military life because it involved too many temptations to an unvirtuous life; these remarks seem hardly
consistent with his acceptance of military training and are probably best understood as conversational arguments.
Another explanation is that Jagerstatter was a pacifist. He had contact with
members of the Jehovah's Witnesses sect - a cousin of his, in fact, was a local
proselytizer for it, and at least twenty Austrian adherents of the sect had been
executed for refusing to accept military service at the time Jagerstatter came to
trial. Jagerstatter's bishop, Bishop Fleisser, writing after the war, pointedly
remarked that the two positions were similar, then concluded that, although "all
respect is due the innocently erroneous conscience.
.for the instruction of men,3
the better models are to be found in the example set by the heroes who conducted themselves 'consistently' in the light of a clear and correct conscience."
(p. 166) But Zahn is convinced, principally from the village interviews, that
Jagerstatter would have taken up arms against Germany had the anschluss been
decided the other way. (Jagerstatter was the only citizen in his village to vote
"nein" in that election.)
A final explanation for Jagerstatter's martyrdom is that he believed the German
army was waging an unjust war and - more important - that the individual
Christian, once he had reached that conclusion, was obliged to resist his own
country's war effort. "I cannot and may not take an oath in favor of a government that is fighting an unjust war" (pp. 106-7) - these were Jagerstatter's
dying words. 4 "Naturally," he had written 5 a year or so earlier, "the words
sound sweet to our ears when we are told that others bear the responsibility for
the results." (p. 229)
s This virile use of "men," by Bishop Fleisser, confined to those who fought for the Fatherland, bears comparison with a short passage from Thoreau which Zahn quotes at 201-02:
Must the citizen ever for a moment, or in the least degree, resign his conscience
to the legislator? Why has every man a conscience then? I think we should be men
first and subject afterward. (Emphasis added.)
Zahn draws no parallel, but the juxtaposition may not have escaped him.
4 He is reported to have said this to the prison chaplain in Berlin on the night of the
execution.

5 In "On Responsibility," one of nine essays written at St. Radegund, probably in 1942;
they are reproduced by Zahn, one of them in the text, the remainder in an appendix.
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Because Jagerstatter had been convinced that the Nazi regime was unjust
before it even became a regime, his conclusion that its wars of conquest were
unjust was hardly surprising. His immediate problem was not this intellectual
judgment, but the question of what he should do about induction. His experience, his reading, and his introspection all argued for resistance, but, like More,
he was unwilling to resist if there was a moral alternative. 6 Almost everything
Zahn's considerable research has unearthed argues against Bishop Fleisser's somewhat flippant postwar conclusion that Jagerstatter "thirsted for martyrdom and
for the expiation of sin." (p. 165) The more persuasive conclusion is that Jagerstatter thirsted for any kind of pastoral advice against martyrdom which was
not patent accommodation. "[T]here is no longer any likelihood that there will
be a bloody persecution of Christians here, for virtually anything the Nazis want
or demand Christians will yield," he said. (pp. 113, 214)7 "Almost all of us are
quite willing to glut ourselves on the spoils of thievery, but we want to saddle
the responsibility for the whole dirty business on one person alone!" (p. 224)8
His essays and letters are filled with this almost despairing cry for courageous
guidance: "I cannot turn the responsibility for my action over to the Fiihrer,"
(p. 105)9 and from the essay "On Responsibility": "No one wants to accept
responsibility for anything." (p. 227) Elsewhere he wrote:
One really has no cause to be astonished that there are those who can no
longer find their way in the great confusion of our day. People we think we
can trust, who ought to be leading th- way and setting a good example, are
running along with the crowd. No one gives enlightenment, whether in word
or in writing. (p. 229)
If road signs were ever stuck so loosely in the earth that every wind could
break them off or blow them about, would anyone who did not know the road
be able to find his way? And how much worse is it if those to whom one
turns for information refuse to give him an answer or, at most, give him
the wrong direction just to be rid of him as quickly as possible! (p. 230) 10
If people took as much trouble to warn men against the serious sins which
bring eternal death, and thus keep them from such sins, as they are taking

6 Compare

More's careful position on the oath demanded of him by Henry VIII -

that he refused the oath, but refused also to risk greater royal displeasure by explaining why
he refused the oath. Letter of April 17, 1534, from More to Marearet Roper, in ELIZABETH
F. ROGERS (ed.), ST. THOMAS MORE: SELECTED LETTERS 216, 220 (1961):
I feared lest the King's Highness would as they said take displeasure enough toward
me for the only refusal of the oath. And that if I should open and disclose the
causes why, I should therewith but further exasperate his Highness, which I would
in no wise do, but rather would I abide all the danger and harm that might come
toward me, than give his Highness any occasion of further displeasure than the offering of the oath unto me of pure necessity constrained me.
7 From the essay, "On the Question of Our Day: Catholic or Nazi."

a From the essay, "Little Thoughts Concerning Our Past, Present and Future."
9A remark, shortly before his death, to the prison chaplain.
10 This paragraph and the preceding one are from the essay, "Is There Anything the Individual Can Still Do?"
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to warn me against a dishonorable death, I think Satan could count on no
more than a meager harvest in the last days. (p. 233)11
No one, to be sure, wanted to see Jagerstatter die. No one counselled him
that his accepting death rather than military service was subjectively sinful although many, including his bishop, continued to believe, even after the war,
that Jagerstatter was in error. The argument made to him - by village curate,
prison chaplains, bishop, defense counsel, and military judges - was that he
should think first of his farm and his family. And Jagerstatter answered: "[If
I had ten children, the greatest demand upon me is still the one I must make of
myself." (p. 53) They argued that there was a distinction between defense of
the Fatherland and support, incidental support perhaps, of a regime that could
be overthrown after the war was won. But Jagerstatter found it impossible to
support the regime without bearing guilt for what it did. "Many people believe
quite simply that things have to be the way they are," he said. "If this should
happen to mean that they are obliged to commit injustice, then they believe
that others are responsible." (p. 101) 12
Jagerstatter's choice was an utterly lonely one. In all of the months he faced
death, and at every moment could have escaped death with the moral rationalization urged upon him by his confessors and his bishop, he found only one scrap
of encouragement - the news that Franz Reinisch had been executed for the
same crime. (The evidence, mainly the observations of persons near Jagerstatter
when he received this news, is that it had an enormous influence upon him.) The
effect that a word or two of encouragement meant to a resister in those dark days
is described by Sartre:
Because the Nazi venom seeped into our thoughts, every accurate thought
was a conquest. Because an all-powerful police tried to force us to hold our
tongues, every word took on the value of a declaration of principles. Because
we were hunted down every one of our gestures had the weight of a solemn
commitment.13
But no word of encouragement came to Jagerstatter; the Austrian Church
had long since capitulated:
For us Austrians, our Maundy Thursday was that infamous April 10,
1938, the day the Austrian Church let herself be taken prisoner, and ever
since, she has lain in chains. And not before this Ja (which even then was given
very hesitantly and anxiously by many Catholics) is balanced by a resounding Nein will there be for us, too, a Good Friday. We are already being called
upon to die, but not for Christ.14
In C. P. Snow's novel, The Light and the Dark, the two central figures, both
IL From a statement he wrote on a piece of cardboard in the Berlin prison.
12 Cf. JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, EXISTENTIALISM 48 (Frechtman

tr., 1947):

"[W]hat is not

possible is not to choose. I can always choose, but I ought to know that if I do not choose, I
am still choosing." Also: "I am responsible for myself and for everyone else. I am creating a
certain image of man of my choosing." Id. at 21.
1 SARTRE, THE REPUBLIC OF SILENCE, quoted at WILLIAM BARRETT, IRRATIONAL MAN
211 (1958).
14 From the essay, "Little Thoughts Concerning Our Past, Present and Future."
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English academics, visit the Berlin of the early, ambiguous days of Hitler's regime
and there meet a Nazi propaganda official. His program for solidifying support
of National Socialism is that "in the long run, people believe what they hear if they hear nothing else."' 15 This implies, on the one hand, that the engines of
popular support must be active - and Zahn hardly needed to assemble evidence
that they were active in Austria in 1942 and 1943; the most persuasive propaganda in those months would have been simple news reports of the campaign in
Russia. On the other hand, the people must hear nothing else; the possible
engines of resistance must be silenced. The utter pathos of the German-Austrian
Church which sounds through the documents of Franz Jagerstatter is that it did
not even need to be silenced. It not only willingly retreated to its corner, it
advanced the Nazi war effort and even, at times, tolerated the domestic programs
of sterilization and abortion.
Because Jagerstatter's was a "social background one would not ordinarily
associate with such an overtly rebellious act" (p. 4), he seemed to pose significance to Zahn as a sociologist. In a way the professional appeal is regrettable
because scientific interest is sometimes an obstacle to the far more important
task of presenting a balanced picture of an unusual man; certainly the sociological apparatus - whether or not one wishes to call that apparatus "scientific"
- usually shows up as an unnecessary complication in the story.16 (Zahn admits
that, because he is both a Catholic and a conscientious objector, his personal
involvement in the story was not entirely consistent with his "scientific" interest init.17) But his principal sociological :omment, fortunately, is confined to a
final chapter on rebellion against civil authority. In this chapter he makes two
significant distinctions - between, on the one hand, a rebel who cannot identify
himself with any institutional or historical position and a rebel who looks for
support to an institution to which he can remain loyal even while he defies his
society; and, on the other hand, between the Church as an almost governmental
institution, something which finds it awkward to resist what civil authority does,
and the Church as a community of believers which looks to its own historical
tradition for its sanctions rather than to the values of the society which surrounds it.
Zahn therefore sees Jagerstatter as a rebel who sought his sanction in the
Scriptures and the stories of saints, which were almost his only adult reading,
rather than as a rebel who had no historical identification at all. The institution
failed to produce a similar communal reaction because it ignored its history. It
takes no great sophistication in behavioral science to understand that; at any
rate, Franz Jagerstatter appears to have understood it. "[M]ost institutions," as
William James put it, "by the purely technical and professional manner in which
15 SNOW, THE LIGHT AND THE DARK 263 (1947).
16 This is particularly apparent in the early chapters of the book, where his penchant for

sociological jargon - "extreme social deviant," "social codes," "deviant individual or family," etc. - is more apparent than in the later chapters, when, one might conjecture, Jagerstatter begins to dominate his thought as a man rather than as a phenomenon.
17 "It
was not very long . . . before it became clear that I was 'involved' in the unfolding
story . . . as a Catholic [and] . .. as a conscientious objector." (p. 6) Zahn has done a significant amount of scholarship on the sociology of conscientious objection, notably in his
doctoral thesis at the Catholic University of America.
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they come to be administered, end by becoming obstacles to the very purposes
which their founders had in view." 18 At least to the devout Catholic, that sort
of judgment about his Church as a community of believers is difficult; it clearly
formed no part of Jagerstatter's rebellion. But the judgment is almost inevitable
when one considers the German and Austrian Church, and neither Jagerstatter
nor Zahn evaded it:
The Church with which he linked his refusal to serve was the Church of
prophets and martyrs that had been abandoned and rejected by those who
constituted the acting Church in Nazi Germany and Austria. (p. 192)
If the Nazi war effort did not meet the traditional requisite conditions of
"the just war," and I have seen no serious theological effort to prove the
contrary, it would seem that . . . the Bishop, not the peasant, and all of the

Catholics he regarded as "greater heroes" were acting in erroneous conscience, that only Jagerstatter acted in accordance with the objective fact
that Hitler's wars were not the just wars in which the Christian is permitted
to bear arms. (p. 171)
In the last analysis Jagerstatter's witness does not yield. to concepts; it was a
total human response, a courageous acceptance of responsibility for the injustice
of Hitler's wars that few men were willing to bear at that time and place. For
this reason, sociological restatement of what he did seems faintly irreverent, and
philosophical analysis in terms of moral postulates seems inadequate. The contribution this book makes is that it competently assembles information. The Jagerstatter story is more exciting than West's story of the English monsignor and the
Italian saint, for the Jagerstatter story happened. But there remains here a task
for poets; the last word about Franz Jagerstatter will be written by a Morris West
or Jean Anouilh or Robert Bolt of the future.
THOMAS L. SHAFFER
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THE CITY OF THE GODS: A STUDY IN MYTH AND MORTALITY. By John S.
Dunne, C.S.C. New York: The Macmillan ,Co., 1965. Pp. xii, 243. $5.95.
Every man, conscious of the meaning of being human in his society and age,
is aware that he will die and that he desires to live. It is the contention of John
Dunne's The City of the Gods that in each society and age there is a characteristic

expression of this awareness, this desire, and their reconciliation. This expression
is here called a "myth." The reconciliation is effected as a problem is solved.
Each myth purports to be a solution to the problem of death.
In itself Dunne's theme is not entirely new. As he observes, he has been
influenced by Heidegger's view of human existence as a "being towards death."
(p. vii) Miguel Unamuno has distinguished men from animals by man's, care
for his dead, and has seen all love as a search for eternity.1 Sigmund Freud has
1 "IEternidad! i eternidad! Este es el anhelo; la sed de eternidad es lo que se llama
amor entre los hombres; y quien o otro ama es que quiere eternizarse en el." MIGUEL
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said, "the evolution of civilization may be simply described as the struggle of the
human species for existence."' 2 Norman Brown has attempted to combine
anthropology and psychology in explaining how man "represses his own death"
and "aggressively builds immortal cultures and makes history in order to fight
death."3 These statements have affinity to Dunne's thesis, and the psychoanalytic
approach of discovering hidden meaning beneath the apparent purpose of
human gestures has affinity with Dunne's approach. Yet Dunne's formulation of
cultural history in terms of the problem of death and its mythical solution is
original. In relating his theme to a variety of cultures, he gives it concreteness,
richness, power in a word, a development which constitutes a subtle
and perceptive contribution to the investigation of human purpose.
Three examples may suffice to specify Dunne's general thesis. The myth of
the post-Homeric, pre-Platonic Greek city-state was the immortality of the past.
A man was his deeds; his deeds were immortal. Man and his city lived forever
in deeds that could not be undone. In a society of this kind, tragedy as
Aeschylus testified, consisted in this, that evil deeds once done could never be
undone. In such a society, law was set by the immortal past. In such a society,
Pericles could be sure that the Athenian warriors had not died in vain, for,
whatever the future of Athens, their deeds, and so the city itself, would never die.
The myth governed the approach to art, to law, to political existence. (pp. 93-99)
The myth of the hierarchical society of medieval Europe was that the office
or role of a man was immortal. Discord existed if a man was not in his proper
office, but there was no tragedy; for a han.ionious rearrangement fitting everyone
to his proper place in an actualization of all the potentialities of the hierarchy
was possible, as Dante contended in Monarchy, and showed in The Divine
Comedy. The function of law, as Gratian witnessed, was to make harmony of
discord. Law kept man in his proper role. No office died. At the summit of
society was the emperor or king assimilated in his body politic to Christ in his
risen body. The state was immortal as its ruler was immortal. (pp. 163-72)
In modem Western society the myth is that the future is at man's disposal.
In this society, tragedy lies in not having a future, as Arthur Miller demonstrates
inDeath of a Salesman. The purpose of law is to channel future action; it looks
to results more than precedents. The society itself is immortal as long as its
future lies ahead. Unlike Pericles at Athens, Lincoln at Gettysburg could believe
that the fallen Union soldiers had not died in vain only if the future vindicated
them. (pp. 205-12)4
In describing these different attitudes toward death as myths, does Dunne
imply that each statement is untrue? The answer is, no and yes. Each myth,
UNAMUNO,

DEL SENTIMENTO TRAOICO DE

LA VIDA EN LOS HOMBRES Y

EN LOS PUEBLOS

38-39 (Buenos Aires, 1937).
2 Freud treats Eros or "the instincts of life" as a force engaged in perpetual struggle
with Death or "the instincts of destruction." SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DisCONTENTS

103 (tr. by Joan Riviere, London, 1930).

0. BROWN, LIFE AGAINST DEATH: THE PSYCHOANALYTIC MEANING OF
HISTORY 101 (New York, 1959).
4 Gratian and Miller are added here; their addition may suggest how satisfactorily
the thesis of the book may be extended beyond the examples it itself provides.
3 NORMAN
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in fact, reflects some human experience. Some deeds cannot ever be literally
undone, and some men may be unforgettable by virtue of their deeds. Status
has actually survived those who enjoyed it. The future has vindicated the
sacrifice of some who have fallen. Yet, while the myths reflect experience, they
are false as solutions to the problem of death; indeed, they reflect a basic misconception. There is, Dunne holds, no solution and no problem; there is only
a mystery which man can never by his own efforts solve. 5 Among the responses
to the facts of death and the desire for life, Christianity holds a privileged
position because it denies neither the one nor the other and yet offers no human
solution, leaving the mystery to the God to whom Abraham and Isaac are alive.
This view of Christianity is the evaluation of Dunne, a Christian theologian.
Whether this evaluation is accepted or not, his account of the myths may be
accepted independently. It rests on a combination of anthropological, political,
legal, and literary evidence, and on a judgment on the nature of man.
There are, it seems to me, two tests by which to measure the value of an
insight claiming to account for a great variety of human action: Does it focus on
a human element of great importance? Is it heuristic? Obviously, I should say,
no single insight, however perceptive, will suffice to account for everything. Class
warfare is one phenomenon from which a perspective may be gained on all
society; the sexual drive, in all its manifestations and sublimations, another.
The history of the West may be read as the development of a will to die, or as
a series of challenges and responses. None of these theories, however inclusive
its author purported to make it, has been persuasive to the disinterested observer
as a full explanation of all the phenomena it undertook to explain. The value
of each of them, however, has been measurable in terms of the two tests applicable here.
In the present instance the author is too modest and too sagacious to
proceed with the fanatical certainty that has marked some of the famous
theorists of human action. Nonetheless, he presses boldly his claim that most
societies have been built on their solutions to the problem of death. I react to
generalizations of this breadth with the conviction that any such statement cannot
be adequate to embrace the phenomena of human life. The reductive method
finding "this" is "essentially" "that," catches one aspect but loses another. In
particular, it seems to me that the drive to love and to be loved is distinct from
the desire for life. "Neither Creator nor creature ever was without love," teaches
Dante. 6 When Unamuno says that love means to eternalize oneself in one's beloved,
he ignores Dante's example of Francesca da Rimini and her beloved caught in
an eternal loveless union.7 Dunne reads the Tithonus myth as a "sour grapes"
rejection of immortality. (p. 70) I read it as a statement that life without love
5 Dunne's use of "problem" and "mystery" may be compared with that of Marcel's
distinction between a problem as an objective matter which can be solved and a mystery
as "something in which I am myself engaged." GABRIEL MARCEL, ETRE ET AVOIR 169
(Paris, 1935).
As for Marcel, so for Dunne, the idea of mystery may be "bound up with
the very idea of God." GABRIEL MARCEL, METAPHYSICAL JOURNAL 161 (tr. by Bernard
Wall, London, 1952).
a DANTE, PUROATORIO, 17.92.
7 DANTE, INFERNO, 5.
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is intolerable. Only in the spirit of pushing a thesis to its logical limit could
it be asserted that "when desire is specified . . . it invariably turns out to be a
form of the desire to live." (p. 221) Dunne's thesis, however, is not to be judged
at its logical limit. It is to be measured by the two relevant tests: Does it focus
on a human element of great importance? Is it heuristic?
The answer to the first question depends, in part, on common-sense observation, in part, on detailed, specialized investigation and interpretation. The fact
that man dies is as obvious as that man has sexual tendencies. The fact that
man desires to live is, perhaps, equally obvious. That the reconciliation of death
and the desire to live underlies some human acts, such as praying for longevity,
is as obvious as that the sexual impulse often leads to marriage. The difficult
task is to show that the impulse, so evident in certain public ways, is also at
work in a multitude of unacknowledged channels.
The evidence Dunne adduces here is drawn from a range extending from
Babylonian society to modern Russia. It is taken principally from literature
and law. Evidence is necessarily selective; it is helpful evidence if it is given without the suppression of counterevidence, presented with a candid estimation of its
probativeness, chosen with a sense of relevance which excludes the farfetched
and the repetitious. On these scores Dunne's evidence is helpful. It is fairly,
candidly, relevantly selected. It is not massive; a Frazer might have written
a book for each of Dunne's chapters. This sparseness of documentation is both
a weakness and a strength. The evidence is not accumulated to the point where
assent is compelled. Yet enough evidencu is presented to suggest that Dunne's
view is not fantastic or purely speculative; and the reader's mind, not overwhelmed by data, is led to focus on prime clues. Only a good anthropologist
could assess the validity of Dunne's use of the evidence from early societies to
show that cities were once built so that men could live with the gods (pp. 30-34),
or that councils were organized so that men could sit and deliberate like gods.
(p. 43) Only a close student of literature could evaluate decisively the interpretation of The Iliad as parody (pp. 50-52), or of The Divine Comedy as a
comedy. (pp. 163-72) A less specialized reader can only report that Dunne
appeals to good authorities, that his reading of the data is perceptive and
nuanced, and that each piece of evidence has been chosen by a discriminating
intelligence. The evidence is, I think, sufficient to establish that mythical
solutions of the problem of death have played a substantial role in human
cultures. The reader, faced with the manifold implications of the myths, is not
coerced, but he is attracted by the thesis, stimulated by its development, and
himself, perhaps, led to speculate.
By this second test, its power to cause investigation and discovery, the book
is as successful as by the test of the significance of the human tendencies explored. In the area of law, Dunne's proposition bears both on the general
nature of law and on particular legal institutions. It may be useful to consider
the kind of questions his book directly or indirectly raises.
If natural law is conceived of as based on human wants and human limits,
then Dunne's work brings needed emphasis to a fundamental aspect of natural
law. The basic facts of immortal longings and mortality may be obvious; their
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impact on the structure of law is not. Dunne's thesis that human law-making
is radically affected by solutions to the problem of death invites a jurisprudential
response. A jurisprudence appealing to man's nature must call attention to the
permanent roots of the myth-making and describe the danger in each inadequate solution to the problem. "Natural law" thinking then will function as
useful agnosticism before solutions to what is a mystery.
From this perspective such an old concept of jurisprudence as "equality"
may be freshly examined. In recent discussion it has seemed that this term was
perfectly empty, since no one is willing to say that all men are equal in all respects. 8 Men are equal to other men insome respects and are entitled to equal
treatment in some ways. How do you establish what respects are relevant?
It has been difficult to answer this vital question by another resort to "equality."
In a society which believed in God, it would seem that the question might be
answered theologically, by an appeal to man's relation to the living God: all men,
it could be said, are equal before God, in the sense that no man has a more
valid claim to eternal life than any other man. If the society does not believe
in God, the most evident respect in which all men are equal is their mortality.
In either case, the view of death, and the solution of the problem of death,
affect the determination of equality. "Equality under God and the law" suggests certain respects in which men will be differentiated; "equality before death
and the law" suggests other respects. The difference between the two formulas
is not enough from which to deduce all the differences between a society accepting one and a society accepting the other; it is a starting point for observation.
The formulas, differing in their view of death, imply consequences which the
bare abstraction "equality," unrelated to the problem of death, fails to convey.
There is usefulness, then, here in Dunne's hypothesis.
Dunne's approach might also be used to illuminate various types of natural
law theories. He himself applies it to two natural law theories of the Roman
empire. The late republic and early empire, he contends, solved the problem
of death by insisting on the uniformity of human experience; in forty years,
as Marcus Aurelius said, a wise man had experienced everything. 9 In the context
of this solution a natural law was posited which took it that the experience of
all men was the same. (pp. 141-43) In the later empire, the diversity of legal
patterns tolerated in the Roman system made men think that all men had in
common was their animal nature; the old view of natural law was rejected;
and with its rejection went the myth of uniform experience. A new solution to
the problem of death became necessary. (pp. 147-48)
Clearly, the Stoic view of natural law has much in common with Aristotle's;
the Roman myth on the solution of the problem of death, so different from
the Athenian one, cannot be the sole reason that Stoic natural law was congenial
to first century Roman minds. Yet the relation between the myth's teaching of
the sameness of human experience and the prevalence of natural law is worth
8
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exploring. As Hume maintained, and as Dunne repeats (p. 142), our own modern beliefs on the probative force of experience rest on shaky ground. 10 If the
Roman myth of recurrent experience strikes us now as unlikely, it may aid our
modem understanding of a natural law "based on experience" to examine a
natural law "based on recurrent experience," and to ponder the relation between
the solution of the problem of death and the motives for accepting the concept
of natural law.
Of the legal institutions to which Dunne's approach might be profitably
applied the most universal is war; for if law is the direction of human conduct in
accordance with distinct rules, war is a distinct legal state, with rules and
objectives, whose varieties may well be partially accounted for by differing views
of the problem of death. As this is one institution which may bring death
quickly to many men, it might indeed be expected that the current myth would
have a substantial effect on its conduct. Why do men fight rather than negotiate?
If the cause is hopeless, why do they fight rather than surrender? Why in an
ancient age could the result of the combat of two champions decide the fate
of an empire, while in a more civilized age it is necessary to destroy women and
infants by bombing? Dunne's book does not go far in the explorations of these
questions, but far enough to suggest the relevance of his central theme to the
perceptible variations in the violence and extent of war. For example, he suggests that the total destruction of a city in Mesopotamian warfare was related
to the idea that cities were the abode of gods, and a defeated city had to be
destroyed to force its gods to abandon it. (p. 29) Extending his approach to a
modem situation one might suggest that the concept of the equality of men in
their mortality is related to the use of mass armies to decide national quarrels.
Such a suggestion might be compared with De Rougernont's contention that a
society's view of love affects its view of war.11 This kind of hypothesis is not
capable of satisfactory proof and is evidently mistaken if intended as a comprehensive explanation. But as furnishing an insight, an approach, it may be helpful. In approaching a legal phenomenon as serious and as little understood
as war, the lines suggested by Dunne seem to be of use.
There are more particular legal institutions which offer themselves as prime
objectives for analysis in terms of solution of the problem of death. The will
is the most obvious one, as on its face it attempts to solve some problems created
by death; and one might suspect that the treatment of these secondary problems
the disposition of property, the treatment of the body, provision for the
soul's welfare - would be affected by a society's view of the main problem.
The trust, in its testamentary form, is an extension of the will which permits a
dead man's directions to affect the property of individuals and the conduct of
institutions, it may be, for generations; in its'inter vivos form it may assure the
same kind of influence over the future to a living grantor. The corporation, like
the inter vivos trust, permits the living to establish channels for human behavior
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which will last long after they themselves are dead. The will, the trust, and the
corporation are all peculiarly legal solutions to the problem of death.
Dunne's book itself deals with none of these forms. Lawyers themselves, although they deal with them all the time, rarely advert to their functions in relation to death. Most clients, when having their wills drawn, are able to suppose
that in some way they will be affected by what happens to their property after
they die and can be sensibly excited by the thought of its falling into the wrong
hands, but neither they nor their legal draftsmen speculate on how the actual
disposition of the decedent's estate could make the slightest difference to the
client now deceased. He remains, personified indeed, as the decedent. The
administration and judicial supervision of wills and trusts are undertaken with
attention to his express or presumed wishes. The myth is sedulously preserved that
by means of the will the client's own living willful intention is still present directing the uses to which his old property is put. The myth that death is overcome
by living directions for the future is, perhaps, even more important in the
establishment of corporations and charitable institutions designed to live in
perpetuity.
The connection between wills and a society's view of death has been noted
by the legal historians. 12 Sheehan's recent account of the development of the
institution in England begins with the Anglo-Saxon era, in which the will was
unknown; the family normally succeeded to the deceased's property, but certain
equipment was buried with the body.13 The Christian view was that the soul
lives after death, and with this notion came the idea that the soul's welfare
could be influenced by charitable almsgiving at the time of death. Some property
one quarter or one third - should, then, be set aside for almsgiving. This
patristic idea of "the soul's share" was introduced to the Anglo-Saxons and became the germ of the institution of the will.1 4 Well into the fourteenth century
the religious aspect of the will, and the religious motivations for making it, were
dominant in England. That testamentary capacity was claimed even for a
married woman or a villein who had no general property rights was linked
to the view that the will provided for the soul.15 This relation between the
English will and one aspect of Christian theology is well established. What has
not been investigated is the relation between modern views of death and the
evolution of the will. Land became subject to wills about the time the medieval
myth on death was rejected. Would a detailed examination show the spread in the
United States of the trust of personal property to be a peculiarly American
response to death? How great is the connection between the desire for institutional immortality and the vast amount of private American philanthropy? Does
the difference between the American legal form of testamentary arrangements
and, say, the Spanish, respond to different views of the problem of death? The
close examination of American legal rules, and comparative analysis, would provide a way for testing Dunne's hypothesis that societies are organized around the
12E.g., E. F. Bruck's Totentiel und Seelgerat im greischen Recht (Munich, 1926).
is MICHAEL M. SHEEHAN, THE WILL IN MEDEVAL ENGLAND 5-6 (Toronto, 1963).
14 Id. at 8.
15 Id. at 16 and at 105.
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views of the problem and its solution. I suspect that a study organized to test
this hypothesis here would be fruitful.
The connection between the concept of the corporation and Christian
theology was explored in much detail eight years ago by Ernst H. Kantorowicz in
The King's Two Bodies. Shamefully, no American law review considered this
work germane enough to the interests of its readers to warrant review. The sole
English legal reviewer, S. B. Chrimes, complained, with some justice, that despite
the erudition he brought to his examination, Kantorowicz had failed to come
"to closer grips with the practical problems and the hard realities which confronted the English common lawyers."' 1 6 Kantorowicz showed that the theology
of the divine and the human nature of Christ and the theology of the mystical
body of the Church had been applied by canonists to ecclesiastical institutions,
by legists to imperial institutions, and eventually by English common lawyers to
the Crown. He offered no real hypothesis as to why this kind of adaptation
went on. Drawing on Kantorowicz's work for his consideration of the medieval
myth, Dunne makes the whole process intelligible by analyzing it as a response
to the problem of death. The same kind of analysis might be attempted for
the corporation. As Kantorowicz shows, the corporation sole acquired in legal
thought the attributes theology assigned to the angels.' 7 To say that the lawyers
here took over the language of the theologians is to stop at one level of explanation; to say that the lawyers had to solve certain hard practical problems
and found appropriate language somewhere is to stop at another level; to suggest
that both the problems and the kind of higuage chosen were a form of response
to a universal human situation is to offer a hypothesis of greater explanatory
power, however qualifications and caveats must finally limit it. The perspective
afforded by The City of the Gods leads to this sort of speculation; and this sort
of hypothesis as to the more universal function of the legal solutions would
seem, in fact, to be germane even to the work of lawyers and judges concerned
with the immediate questions of corporate powers and purposes.
We may exorcise death as not proud but pitiful, "slave to Fate, Chance,
Kings, and desperate men"; but we cannot legislate or guarantee "Death, thou
shalt die."' 8 As long as we cannot, Dunne is right in seeing mythical solutions to
the problem of death as pervasive in our attempts to order experience. In
brilliantly directing our averted attention to the myths, he has done a service
of great value.
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